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Finan: Selected Preference Problems

THE SECURED PARTY AND HIS
NEMESIS, THE TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY: AFTER-ACQUIRED
PROPERTY, UNIDENTIFIED
PROCEEDS, AND SELECTED
PREFERENCE PROBLEMS
by John P. Finan*
I. A Brief Historical Sketch
BANKRUPTCY, in addition to succeeding to the
rights of the bankrupt,' has several avoiding powers. Some
of these avoiding powers 2 are based on practices which, like vice,
are of "so frightful mien that to be hated [need] but to be seen." 3
Preferences may not be included among such practices. Indeed,
the English view 4 exhibits ambivalence towards preferences. At
one time it regarded "preferences [as] the good fortune of the
creditor." 5 A later view was
"that the preferring of one creditor over others within a
short time of bankruptcy and in contemplation thereof, was
a 'fraud on the bankruptcy law' which could be required to
be righted or undone." 6
In the United States the voidability of preferences has been
statutory,7 and the Statute with which this paper is concerned is
the Federal Bankruptcy Act. That Act provides that any
preference as defined8 therein

A

TRUSTEE IN

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. B.A.,
Fordham University; J.D., Columbia University.
1 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a) and (b) (1953).
2 11 U.S.C.A. § 107 (d) (2) (d).
3 A. Pope, Essay on Man. Epistle II, Part V, Lines 1 and 2.
4 H. Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States
§ 1655, 190 (1957).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.

8 "A preference is a transfer, as defined in this act of any of the property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating
a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable
such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class." 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (1) (1968).
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"may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it
or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference
thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." 9
Of course, fraud may be involved. If a payment is made or security given in payment of, or as security for, an antecedent debt
three days before bankruptcy, and the party paid swears that
payment was in fact made four months earlier, there is fraud.
The party paid has perjured himself about an essential element
of preference. This type of deceit was facilitated prior to 1938
in cases involving mortgages not recorded until just prior to
bankruptcy although they had allegedly existed long before, and
involving so-called equitable liens, secret liens which were not
fully perfected until immediately before bankruptcy, but which
related back to a time which precluded vulnerability under the
Bankruptcy act.10 The vice of recognizing secret liens was twofold: One, such recognition facilitated fraud and two, potential
creditors were deceived concerning the true state of a potential
debtor's affairs. The second evil is so classified on the assumption that creditors lend money on the basis of ostensible ownership. This assumption has been subject to criticism and may, in
fact, have no foundation.11
A major revision to the Bankruptcy Act was made in 1938
by the Chandler Amendment. One consistent theme which runs
through the legislative history of that amendment is that secret
liens must be invalidated.12 All secret liens? No, although a
case could probably have been made for the desirability of providing that a transfer shall be deemed to take place when the
9 11 U.S.C.A. 96(b) (1968).
10 See J. MacLachlan, Handbook of the Law of Bankruptcy 295 (1956). See
also Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code
and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 76, 77 & 78
(1951); Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to the AfterAcquired Property Clauses Under the Code. 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194, 202 et
seq. (1959).
11 E. Farnsworth and J. Honnold, Commercial Law, Cases & Materials 775
(1968).
12 The invalidation was accomplished by defining artificially the time of
transfer: ". . . [A] transfer shall be deemed to have been made when it becomes so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein and if such transfer
is not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition in Bankruptcy or of the
original petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, it shall be
deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy" (emphasis supplied). B.A. as amended by Act of March 18, 1950, P. L. 461, 81st Cong.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/1

2

Finan: Selected Preference Problems

SELECTED PREFERENCE PROBLEMS

transfer is publicized by filing or when the secured party takes
possession of the collateral.' 3 Congress did not take this functional approach but instead decided to postpone the transfer
under the provision cited in footnote 12.
Since unrecorded mortgages and equitable liens, the two
types of secret liens aimed at by the 1938 Amendment, were
4
subject to defeat by bona-fide purchasers under State law,'
the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler Amendment achieved its
goal of eliminating the types of secret liens which prior to 1938
had caused the most controversy. Questions remained unanswered. What of secret liens which were not vulnerable to bonafide purchasers? 15 What of publicized liens which were vulnerable? A question of great moment because of the thenburgeoning business of lending on the security of accounts receivable, under so-called "non-notification financing," was
whether or not the security interest in such accounts was vulnerable under the Bankruptcy Act.
One who reads the legislative history of the Act would
probably agree that publicized liens, certainly those publicized
by filing under security statutes such as the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act, should be safe. The secret lien was the vice aimed
at by the 1938 Amendment. Certainly no reason existed to
strike down the various statutes which enabled lending on the
security of inventory. The difficulty here is that the secured
party must depend for the repayment of his debt on the sale of
the inventory, and it is impossible to draft a statute providing
for inventory security without providing that a buyer who buys
in good faith without knowledge that the purchase is in violation of the rights of a secured party takes free of the security
interest. Such a provision is found in § 9-307 (1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 6 and a similar provision is found in § 9 of
Analysis of H.R. 12889, House Judiciary Committee Print, 74 Cong., 2d
Sess., 188 (1936) "The purpose of the test [see note 12 supra] is to strike
down secret transfers, and thus the transfer is to be deemed made when it
becomes known and not when it was actually made."
14 The same Analysis, supra n. 13, states that the perfection test "...
includes a failure to record and any other ground that could be asserted by
a bona fide purchaser ...
" Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) 188.
15 They were safe despite Analysis, supra n. 13.
16 Unless otherwise indicated all references as to the U.C.C. are to the 1962
official text with comments. The Code was not adopted in any state until
after the 1950 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, which amendment elimi(Continued on next page)
13
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the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act. If one reads literally, it could
be argued that a buyer in the ordinary course of trade is a bonafide purchaser and therefore no security interest in inventory
is deemed perfected under the Bankruptcy Act until "immediately before bankruptcy." Such an interpretation seems unreasonable and an analysis of the Bankruptcy Act in light of its purpose suggests that a buyer in the ordinary course of trade within
the meaning of the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act is not a bona-fide
purchaser within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court never had an opportunity to analyze this question,
although a lower Federal court 17 decided that since a lien under
the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act is subject under § 9 of the Act
to buyers in the ordinary course of trade, perfection is postponed until "immediately before bankruptcy," when of course
all of the elements of bankruptcy will almost certainly be present.
This opinion recalls the admonition of Walter Wheeler Cook
given in 1942: 18

"The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two
or more legal rules and so in connection with more than
one purpose has and should have precisely the same scope
in all of them runs through all legal discussions. It has all
the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded
against."
We have seen that a Federal District Court let down its guard.
We will never know what the Supreme Court would have
done. 19 Some clue perhaps is provided by the case of Corn Ex(Continued from preceding page)
nated the bona fide purchaser test re personalty. It is cited to support the
truth of the statement that inventory security must be salable free of the
security interest, to certain types of bona fide purchasers.
17 Matter of Harvey DistributingCo., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 466 (D.C. Va., 1950)
rev. sub nom Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773.
(C.A. 4th, 1951)
18 G. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflicts of Law 159 (1942).
19 We do know what the 4th Cir. Court of Appeals did. It reversed on the
basis of the 1950 amendment to the B. A. Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v.
O'Donnell, supra n. 17. The 1950 amendment still in effect provides:

"(2)

For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section

[§ 60], a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to
have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that
no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the

transferee. A transfer of real property shall be deemed to have been made
or suffered when it became so far perfected that no subsequent bona fide
(Continued on next page)
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change National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder,20 where the
Supreme Court held that since a bona-fide purchaser of accounts receivable who gave notice to the obligor on an assigned
account had rights under State (Pennsylvania) law superior to
those of the first assignee, the first assignment was deemed not
perfected within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court admitted that:
"notice to the debtors sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
applicable State law might never have been communicated
to the creditors, and that many States do not require notice
to the debtor to foreclose possible superior rights of subsequent assignees." 21
Nevertheless, the Court found

"...

nothing in Congressional

policy which warrants taking this case out of the letter of the
Act." 22 The Court reached its conclusion despite the fact that
"the bank had taken an assignment of the accounts receivable
for present consideration" and that "far from being a secret
transaction, this had been arranged by a creditor's committee
which had previously taken supervision of the debtor's business." 23 A curious result is produced by the decision in the
Klauder 4 case. In those jurisdictions where the first assignee
is vulnerable to challenge by a bona-fide purchaser, the lien is
subject to attack by the trustee in bankruptcy. We know that
(Continued from preceding page)
purchase from the debtor could create rights in such property superior to
the rights of the transferee. If any transfer of real property is not so perfected against a bona fide purchase or if any transfer of other property is
not so perfected against such liens by legal or equitable proceedings prior
to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be
deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of the petition."
11 U.S.C. 96(a) (2), P.L. 461, 81st Cong. ch 70, 2d Sess.
It added (dictum) that even under the unamended Act, it would have
reversed, reasoning as follows: "[I]t is hardly reasonable to suppose that
Congress intended to strike down this healthy and 'above the board' business; and it is elementary that acts of Congress are to be given a reasonable
interpretation and not one that leads to hardship and absurd results.
Sorells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-448, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413.
." Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, supra n. 17, 776. The
court quotes approvingly Moore and Tone, 57 Yale L. J. 683, 698: "Nor
would the 'plain meaning' rule of interpretation preclude this view, for the
distinction can readily be drawn between the traditional concept of the bona
fide purchaser and that of the buyer in the ordinary course of trade."
20 Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434
(1943).
21
22
23
24

Id. at 441.
Id. at 438.
J. Moore and L. King, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 943 (14th ed. 1969).
Supra n. 20.
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the Bankruptcy Amendment of 1938 was aimed at certain
secret liens. If we wish to include among the liens struck down
the property interest held by an assignee of accounts receivable, we must attribute to Congress an intent to strike down
secret liens in some States and not in others, based on fortuitous property rules 25 completely unrelated to the basic policy
of the 1938 Amendment. And despite the Court's talk of "policy"
the Klauder opinion generated fear of a literal interpretation of
§ 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. These fears were exacerbated by
the case of Vardaman Shoe Co.,26 where it was held that, if a
bona-fide purchaser of accounts receivable could defeat a prior
assignee by an act performed subsequent to his bona-fide purchase, then the transfer to the first assignee was subject to the
second; and therefore the transfer was not perfected within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. (The subsequent acts referred
to are found in the Restatement of Contracts.) 27 This seems a
strange interpretation of the Act. As Judge Goodrich points
out in the Rosen25 case, the first assignee with rights against a
bona-fide purchaser "may lose them by subsequent events not
connected with the original acquisition." 29 He points out that
the favored position acquired by the subsequent assignee in
See Countryman, supra, n. 10 at 79, for a discussion of the various rules
in the context of accounts receivable financing.
26 In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (1943).
27 Restatement of Contracts § 173 (1932) provides:
"Where the obligee or an assignee makes two or more successive assignments of the same right, each of which would have been effective if it were
the only assignment, the respective rights of the several assignees are determined by the following rules:
(a) A subsequent assignee acquires a right against the obligor to the
exclusion of a prior assignee if the prior assignment is revocable or voidable
by the assignor;
(b) Any assignee who purchases his assignment for value in good faith
without notice of a prior assignment, and who obtains
(i) payment or satisfaction of the obligor's duty, or
(ii) judgment against the obligor, or
(iii) a new contract with the obligor by means of a novation, or
(iv) delivery of a tangible token or writing, surrender of which is
required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement,
can retain any performance so received and can enforce any judgment or
novation so acquired, and, if he has obtained a token or writing as stated
in subclause (iv), can enforce against the obligor the assigned right;
(c) Except as stated in Clauses (a) and (b), a prior assignee is entitled
to the exclusion of a subsequent assignee to the assigned right and its proceeds."
28 In Re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (C.A. 3d, 1946) cert. den. sub nom Fisch v.
Standard Factors Corp., 330 U.S. 835 (1946).
29 Id. at 1001.
25
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the situations noted in the Restatement"

".

.

. comes not from

his status as bona-fide purchaser, but from his activities following his belated assignment." 1 He points out that even if the
New Jersey Courts had adopted the so-called Massachusetts
rule, the second assignee does not acquire rights superior to the
first assignee "by virtue of being a bona-fide purchaser." 32 Judge
Goodrich's view that the Bankruptcy Act's bona-fide purchaser
test gives the trustee only such rights as are derived by a bonafide purchaser's status as such, is consistent with the view that
bona-fide purchaser as used in the Bankruptcy Act "is commonly, though not necessarily, used to designate a person who
makes a bona-fide purchase and does nothing more." 33
The Klauder3 4 case, the Vardaman 35 case and the Harvey 36 case, except for their instructional value in warning observers how the courts may approach the Bankruptcy Act, are
now moot, since many States have solved the problem presented
by passing validation or other statutes making it clear that the
first assignee's rights are superior to those of the second assignee no matter what subsequent actions he has taken. 37 In
other States this had been true, 38 so no amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act was needed to solve the problem posed by
the Klauder39 case. However the Klauder decision troubled the
commercial community. If the Court would apply the language
of the Act literally in the Klauder situation, would it not do so
also in the inventory, and therefore invalidate the Uniform
Trusts Receipts Act, various factor's lien acts, and miscellaneous
other devices providing for inventory security? 40 In the
Restatement of Contracts, supra n. 27.
Supra n. 28, at 1001.
Supra n.28, at 1002.
33 McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy. 60 Harv. L. Rev. 233,
246-247 (1946). It is noteworthy that the author, unlike the Rosen Court,
supra n. 28 at 998, would not give the trustee the benefit of state laws providing that a second assignee who first gave notice would prevail over prior
assignee. Id. at 246. This latter view seems preferable.
30
31
32

34 Supra n. 20.
35 Supra n. 26.

36 Supra n. 17.
3T See Countryman, supra n. 10, at 81.
38 Under the New York rule, id. at 79.
39 Supra n. 20. There was a third group of states (nine in number) which
either followed the English rule applied in Klauder or had no rule at all.
Countryman, supra note 10, at 81-82. In these states safety for assignees
awaited the 1950 Amendment to § 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
40 H. R. Report No. 1293, Aug. 22, 1949, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. to accompany
s. 88 as published in U. S. Code, Cong. Service p. 1987 (1950).
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writer's opinion the answer is no, but this opinion is not sup41
(reversed
ported by Matter of Harvey Distributing Co., Inc.

on appeal but still a cause for worry). 42 That case involved the
Harvey Corporation, which executed notes and trusts receipts
in accordance with provisions of Chapter 147 (b) of the Code of
Virginia (Virginia's version of the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act).
The notes were executed to Coin Machine Acceptance Corporations, the "Entruster." 43 This security interest of the Entruster
was duly filed with the secretary of the Commonwealth on March
28, 1948. Almost a year later, on March 4, 1949, an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy was filed against Harvey, and on March 21,
1949, Harvey was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee attacked
the lien obtained under the Trusts Receipts Act and relied upon
the definition of transfer quoted above.44 Of course the Uniform
Trusts Receipts Act provides that a buyer in the ordinary course
of trade takes free of a filed trust receipt. The policy of the
Act, as was noted earlier, 45 is to protect the buyer whose purchase is essential if the Entruster is to receive repayment of
his loan. The purpose of the bona-fide purchaser test in the
Bankruptcy Act was entirely different, the striking down of
secret liens. It seems perfectly clear that the "plain-meaning"
rule has been ignored in too many instances by the Supreme
Court and lower courts for anyone to seriously contend that
the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia
46
was bound to follow it.

Certainly a determination by that

Supra n. 17.
This case was reversed on the basis of the retroactive 1950 amendment
to the B. A. See Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, supra n. 17.
Although the reversing court said (dictum) that the case was wrongly decided on the basis of the Bankruptcy Act as amended in 1938, that dictum
was not available to the commercial community prior to the 1950 amendment, and there is no assurance that it would have been followed by other
courts. Certainly the Harvey Case was not calculated to give comfort to
those who worried about the future of inventory financing.
43 ". . . person who ...takes a security interest in goods, documents or instruments under a trust receipt transaction ... " U.T.R.A. § 1.
44 Supra n. 12.
45 See text accompanying n. 16 supra.
46 See McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25 (1939); Coin Machine Acceptance Corp.
v.McDonell, supra n. 17. For a more recent case see Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966), where Justice Douglas wrote, "We do not read
those statutory words with the ease of a computer." Id. 103. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting, could not escape the impact of what Congress had done.
See also Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice (1968) 101 to 104 (1968). He writes:
(Continued on next page)
41

42

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/1

8

Finan: Selected Preference Problems

SELECTED PREFERENCE PROBLEMS

court that the Bankruptcy Act was not directed at this result
would have been consistent with the legislative will. 4 7 The
reaction to this case was the amendment to the Bankruptcy Act
which changed the bona-fide purchasertest to the bona-fide purchase test as far as real property is concerned and which substituted a lien creditor test for the bona-fide purchaser test with respect to personal property.4s The new provision protected the
Uniform Trusts Receipts Act from the holding in the Harvey
case, 49 but at the price of bringing back the secret equitable lien.
For although equitable liens may be defeated by a good faith purchase, they are generally not defeated by lien creditors, and
Congress was forced to amend the Bankruptcy Act, adding
§ 60 (a) (6) which made voidable certain equitable liens, so-called
"bad equitable liens." 50 The Harvey case, 51 though clearly overruled by the Statute, still has a cautionary effect. For in some
of the current problems which will be discussed in this paper
hyper-literalism could yield results contrary to the manifest will
of both the state legislatures and the Congress of the United
States. Some of the language of the Harvey case is instructive
on this point. The Court admits:
(Continued from preceding page)
"A rule of guidance must be capable of guiding a choice before a decision
is made. It must be possible for a judge to act on it. A rule of justification
enables a judge to give such rule as a reason for his decision even though
he did not rely on it in making his decision. Rules of guidance are also
rules of justification, but it can be seen in the canons of interpretation that
not all rules of justification are also rules of guidance." Id. at 103. In the
context of the one plain meaning rule MacLachlan wrote: "The history of
statutory construction from earliest times shows a dualism-the conflict between the letter and the spirit. For every decision and every canon of construction saying there is no room for construction when the statutory language is unambiguous and that it is for the legislature and not the court to
review the wisdom of what the legislature has declared, there is another
decision and another canon to the effect that what a statute really says is
to be determined by considering the entire enactment in the light of its
purpose and in view of the mischief to be remedied. The Chandler amendment sought to strike at secret liens, fictions of relation back and inequitable
'equitable liens.'" J. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 301. (1956). See also Traynor, Trial 37, 39. (May 1969).
47 See Moore & Tone, supra n. 18.
48 11 U.S.C.A. 96 (a) (2), cited in full n. 19 supra.
49 Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, supra n. 17.
50 A term used by Professor Gilmore to designate equitable liens made

voidable by B.A. § 60(a) (6).
sonal Property 1919 (1965).

See 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Per-

51 Supra n. 17.
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"At the time of the action of Congress the Uniform Trust Receipt Act was relatively new, and it is not unlikely that
Coin Machine is correct in its contention that Congress did
not contemplate situations arising under that Act which is in
derogation of common law principles and a wide departure
from such principles theretofor firmly embedded in the law
of commerce." 52

However, the Court goes on to say:
"Not having become so perfected [protected against a buyer
in the ordinary course of trade] under § 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act it [the security interest of Coin Machine] must
be deemed to have been made immediately before the bankruptcy and therefore invalid. It is clear that if Congress had
intended that such lien should be valid in bankruptcy, the
italicized language of § 60 (a) would not have been used." 53
Congress, according to this analysis, by its use of the bona-fide
purchaser test, exhibited an intent to strike down inventory
financing and in the context of the Harvey decision exhibited
an intent to make the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act a useless
statute, since creditors who perfected their interest under the
Act would be relegated to the status of general creditors. How
the Court could have been so certain that that was the will of
Congress is not apparent. An explanation can perhaps be found
in the words of Professor Cook quoted above 54 about the tenacity
of the view that words used in different contexts have identical
meaning regardless of their setting.
11. The Present Problem-The Bankruptcy Act and the U.C.C.
The question now to be considered is whether there is a
conflict between the U.C.C.'s validation of the after-acquired
property interest and the Bankruptcy Act as amended in 1950.
The 1950 Amendment was designed:
52

Id. at 468.

53

Id.

54 Supra n. 18.
55 "In Sexton v. Kessler (1912) 225 U.S. 90, the Sup. Ct., under the language

of the Bankruptcy Act prior to the 1938 amendment, recognized as valid a
pledge of stocks and bonds consummated within the 4-month period, at a
time when the pledgor was insolvent, because a promise to make a pledge
had been made before the commencement of the 4-month period. The result was reached by the doctrine of 'relation back."' H.R. Report No. 1293,
August 22, 1949, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. as published in U.S. Code, Cong. Service p. 1986 (1950). "Similarly, in Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916), the
Supreme Court recognized as valid an unrecorded deed to real estate, on
the ground that the applicable State statute did not make such a deed invalid as against judgment creditors. The Carey case, accordingly, became
known as the 'pocket lien' case." Id.
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"(A) To retain unimpaired the basic object of the 1938
Amendment, which eliminated the 'relation back' doctrine
of Sexton v. Kessler, and the 'pocket lien' doctrine of Carey
v. Donohue ...;5
"(B) To eliminate the evil of allowing a trustee in bankruptcy to take the position of a potential and artificial bonafide purchaser, and to restore him to the position of a lien
creditor in harmony with his functions under the Bankruptcy Act; and
"(C) In effectuation of said policy to provide that no
transfer made in good faith, for a new present consideration, shall constitute a preference to the extent of such consideration actually advanced, if the provisions of applicable
State law governing the perfection of such transfer are
complied with, with an appropriately rigid time limitation
(21 days) for such perfection if such limitation is not itself
described by the applicable State law." 56
This problem is most often met when the collateral under
consideration is inventory or accounts receivable. Inventory and
accounts receivable financing obviously involves taking security
interests in future property. Although a balance sheet may show
inventory as being constant, perhaps a hundred thousand dollars in any given month of the year; or, more probably, fluctuating up and down depending on sales; the individual components
of the inventory valued in the balance sheet are continually
changing. The same is true of accounts receivable. Individual
accounts are paid off; other accounts are substituted. A business
analyst doing a funds flow study may ignore the individual
components. The increase of accounts receivable is a use of
funds; the decrease is a source of funds. The same is true of inventory and, indeed, any other item on the asset side of a balance sheet. Difficulty, however, arises in bankruptcy, because
in actuality there are or may be a succession of transfers. Take
a situation where a security interest is perfected in January,
1969, in accounts receivable or in inventory. On December 31,
1969, the debtor goes into bankruptcy. The balance sheet from
month to month may show inventory and accounts receivable
as fairly stable. But as trouble approaches, these accounts will
in most instances decline, since receivables and inventory tend
to vary directly with sales volume according to various formulae. Let us assume that the items are fairly constant from
January until August and then there is a gradual decline up un50

H.R. Report No. 1293, supra n. 55, at 1986.
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til December 31, when a petition in Bankruptcy is filed. It is
clear from a reading of the Uniform Commercial Code that the
Code gives a security interest in the components of inventory
received by the debtor after January 15 and up to December
31. The same is true of individual accounts which come into existence during this period. Section 9-204(3) declares: "Except
as provided in subsection (4) a security agreement may provide
that the collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." The Code provides
in § 9-108 when after-acquired collateral is not security for an
antecedent debt. The intent of the Code draftsmen is clear.5 7
The security interest in after-acquired property should not be
vulnerable. The history which we have recounted of the 1938
and the 1950 Amendments of the Bankruptcy Act demonstrates
no hostility toward publicized security interests.5 Ifthe policy of
the Code is in favor of the validity of the security interest in
after acquired property and there is nothing in the policy of
the Bankruptcy Act which overrides the Code, it seems that the
solution of the problem of reconciling these two Acts should be
a simple one. Unhappily, it is not. The courts have wrestled
with the problem, 59 and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 60
The courts have acted favorably to the Code. Hostility remains. Some hostility can be explained on the basis of the language of the Code. Some runs deeper. Although reversed by
the courts, the opinion of Referee Snedecorol is still persuasive,
and some of its language is worth considering at this point:
"[Under the Uniform Commercial Code] a merchant by
a simple signed agreement, regardless of form, may create
a general floating lien for present and future advances on
57 See Official Comments to § 9-108.

The problem of the vulnerability of some of those non possessory security interests which may be perfected without filing under § 9-302 will be
discussed later (footnote 142 infra).
59 See Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D Mass., 1967); In Re White,
4 U.C.C. Rep. 972 (SD Ohio 1967); Grain Merchants of Indiana Inc. v. Union
Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (C.A. 7, 1969), cert. den. sub nom France,
Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 396 U.S. 827; Dubay v.
Williams, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 885 (1969); Phelps v. National Acceptance Co. of
America, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (U.S. D.C., Md. 1969).
58

60 Supra n. 59.
61 In Re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc., 2 Bankr. L. Rep. f 6172 2
(4th Ed.) (D. Ore. 1966), reversed in part relating to U.C.C.; In re Portland
Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'd sub nom
DuBay v. Williams, supra n. 59.
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inventory and accounts receivable including future acquisitions. With such an agreement in existence the secured

party may leave the merchant in complete control of his
business and funds and yet be protected against the claims
of other creditors, except purchase money security interests,
by filing with the Secretary of State and the County Clerk
a financing statement. Such a statement "is sufficient if it is
signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a
mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral."
(UCC 9-402 (1).) There is no requirement that it contain
any information concerning the limit of the credit to be extended, the amounts advanced or to be advanced or the
terms of payment. All such information must be obtained
from the secured party. The desired information may vary
from day to day according to advances made. So that the
information obtained one day may not serve as a criterion
for credit a few days or weeks later. There seems to be no
requirement that the secured party furnish the desired information in writing. Oral information would be of little value
to an inquiring creditor who may have in contemplation the
extension of credit to the debtor on a secured or unsecured
basis."
Later in his opinion Referee Snedecor writes:
"The old-fashioned method of operating a business on
the strength of equity capital and unsecured bank credit
based upon the financial integrity of the debtor seems to be
giving way to the modern trend of financing business operations in reliance upon a floating lien on current assets with
little or no regard for equity capital. Added to this is the
more recent development of leasing, instead of owning, plant
and equipment. These methods leave the daily suppliers
and employees in a perilous position."
Even the Official Comment expresses doubt regarding the desirability of Code policy:
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against
the floating charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower should
not be allowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the borrower
but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be
preserved. That inarticulate premise has much to recommend it. This Article decisively rejects it not on the ground
that it was wrong in policy but on the ground that it has
not been effective. In the past fifty years there has been
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a multiplication of security devices designed to avoid the
policy: field warehousing, trust receipts, factor's lien acts
and so on. The cushion of free assets has not been preserved. In almost every state it is now possible for the
borrower to give a lien on everything he has or will have.
There have no doubt been sufficient economic reasons for
the change. This Article, in expressly validating the floating charge, merely recognizes an existing state of things.
The substantive rules of law set forth in the balance of the
Article are designed to achieve the protection of the debtor
and the equitable resolution of the conflicting claims of
creditors which the old rules no longer give.6 2 (Emphasis
added.)
It is not surprising that opponents of the Code seize upon
every possible argument to invalidate the "floating lien" under
the Bankruptcy Act. And even those who feel the policy of the
U.C.C. can be reconciled with the Bankruptcy Act find difficulty
in the language of the U.C.C.
Lawrence P. King, Editor in Chief-Revisions of Collier on
Bankruptcy (the leading treatise on bankruptcy), writes:
"§ 9-303 [U.C.C.] says that there can be no perfection
until the security interest attaches. In view of this clear
statutory mandate, how can considerations of policy be
relevant?" 63
The difficulty is suggested by the language of § 9-303(1) that
"[a] security interest is perfected when it has attached and when
all the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken."
Ordinarily all but one step will have been taken when an interest
in after-acquired accounts receivable or after-acquired inventory
is granted. But the one step that the secured party may not have
control over is attachment. Section 9-204 (1) provides: "A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement . . . that it

attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral." If, in our hypothetical case, we take the position that
the debtor obtained rights in the collateral as each component of
inventory was received from January until December, and as
each account came into existence, 64 it could be argued that there
was not one perfection in January but a series of perfections,
62

U.C.C. § 9-204 Official Comment 3.

63 King, § 9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code: Does It Insulate the Security

Interest From Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. of Pa. L. Rev.,
1117, 1130 and 1131 (1966).
64 § 9-204(2) (d).
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some of which took place within the dangerous four months
before bankruptcy. Assume that in January the secured party
extended $100,000 secured by inventory or accounts receivable,
and that the pay-back schedule required that $10,000 per year
be paid commencing in January, 1970. It is clear that, if a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, was made on or
after August 31, it was both a transfer for an antecedent debt and
a transfer within four months before bankruptcy. Assuming
insolvency of the debtor at the time of the transfer and reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, the transaction is vulnerable. The other elements of a preference would
certainly be present and must be assumed by a planner setting
up a security arrangement. A great deal of the concern about
the vulnerability of the security interest in after-acquired property is felt by draftsmen-"office practitioners"-who set up the
transactions. They must assume the worst -in order to give an
unqualified opinion that the security interest is good. They must
assume that if the transfer is deemed to take place within four
months of bankruptcy, then the other elements will be present
and the security interest will be vulnerable. In order for them
to feel safe they must get assurance that the transfer took place
in January (or at least no later than August 30). Various
theories have been put forward to support a January transfer.
The so-called entity theory looks upon the inventory as a single
unit and the accounts receivable as a single unit. Thus there is
only one transfer, the transfer of the entity in January. No
transfer takes place as the components of that inventory or
account receivable entity change. The substitution-of-collateral
theory relies on the doctrine that if collateral is replaced by
other collateral, of an equal or a greater value, prior to the
release of the old security, there is no preference. Section 9-108
is accepted by the Rosenburg v. Rutnick" court as a definition
of antecedent debt and thus saves a security interest. Probably
the best approach is the "so far perfected test." According to
this test, it matters not when there is perfection under the U.C.C.
For the Bankruptcy Act does not require full perfection but
"deems that a transfer is made when it becomes so far perfected
that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee." 66 (Emphasis supplied)
65

Supra n. 59.

66

B.A. 60(a) (2).
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According to this test, even though under the Code, security
interests were perfected in different components of inventory
throughout the entire year from January until December, a
transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act took place
only once, in January. The other tests have received sufficient
commentary to warrant excluding them from this article. However, there are three questions relating to the "so far perfected
test" which will be discussed.
1. In January was the future inventory or the future accounts receivable "property" within the meaning of the Uniform
Commercial Code?
2. Were these future assets "property" within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act?
3. Assuming the answer is yes to both questions above,
could any subsequent lien, that is, a lien obtained subsequent to
the grant of a security interest in the after-acquired property,
become superior to the rights of the transferee?
If the first two of the above three questions are answered in
the affirmative, and the third in the negative, then the transfer
is deemed to have taken place in January according to the
language of the Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (2), and the afteracquired property interest is safe, provided that it successfully
runs the hurdle of Bankruptcy Act § 60 (a) (6). If it is found that
a security interest in future property is a "bad equitable lien"
under Bankruptcy Act 60(a) (6), then the transfer of future
property is not perfected within the meaning of B.A. 60 (a) (2).

M.

The Property Interest

Assume that in January, 1969, all of the requirements of
§ 9-303 (1) were met, with the possible exception of the attachment requirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral.
This assumption suggests that in January legal machinery was
set in motion, so that under state law no subsequent lien creditor
on a simple contract could ever obtain rights superior to the
transferee (secured party). Does it necessarily follow that a
transfer was deemed made in January and that consequently
no transfer took place within the four months preceding bank-

ruptcy? Professor Gordon writes that in fixing the crucial time
of transfer two questions must be asked: (1) "Has a transfer
of any of the debtor's property taken place?" and (2) "If and only
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if, such a transfer has taken place, has it been sufficiently perfected as against lien creditors or bona fide purchasers?" 17 His
opinion that a transfer must be a transfer of property is supported
by the language of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 60(a) (2) of the
Act, in adopting the lien creditor test, speaks of a "transfer of
property other than real property," and in adopting the bona
fide purchase test, a "transfer of real property." Further, the
definition of "transfer" in Bankruptcy Act § 1 (30) talks in terms
of a disposition of property or an "interest therein."
The Uniform Conmmercial Code also talks in terms of property. Section 9-204 provides that the debtor must have rights in
the collateral before a security interest can attach. U.C.C. § 9-105
(c) defines collateral as "property subject to a security interest. . .

."

Section 1-201 (37)

defines a security interest "as an

interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation. ..

."

Assuming that, in our hy-

pothetical case, the debtor obtained rights in Widget #1007 in
December, how is it possible to say that a property interest
existed in January, so that one can say that the only transfer
that took place was the January transfer? If one looks at the
inventory or accounts as an entity, the answer is clear. If, on
the other hand, one looks at inventory in the aggregate, then no
interest accrued in Widget #1007 until December. It is here that
68
Gordon finds the Achilles' heel, and argues that no property
transfer occurred in January with respect to Widget #1007. Before considering Professor Gordon's arguments, which are based
on the federal component of the definition of property, let us first
examine whether there was a security interest transferred in
January under the Uniform Commercial Code.
One approach is to say that when the secured party in
January acquired an interest in the future property called
Widget #1007, he obtained a present right in a general intangible, the proceeds of which general intangible was Widget #1007.
If this approach is correct, then under § 9-306 (3) the security in
Widget #1007 is "a continuously perfected security interest,"
since "the interest in the original collateral was perfected." To
determine whether future property is a species of property, we
turn to § 9-204. Section 9-204 (3) provides that "a security agree67 Gordon, "The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the
U.C.C. and the Preference Problem," 1 Secured Transactions Under the
U.C.C. 1161, 1189 (1969).
68 Id. at 1188-1191.
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ment may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." This
language, though perhaps ambiguous, suggests that the future
property may presently secure obligations. This interpretation
is buttressed by official comment two to § 9-204, which provides:
"The security interest in after-acquired property is not merely
an 'equitable' interest." The implication is clear that an interest
69
Professor
in after-acquired property is a present legal interest.
Gilmore, speaking in another context, supports this view. He
states that "[u]nder Article 9 the future earnings or receivables
of an enterprise can, and on the whole should be, considered as
a presently existing aggregate or entity." He adds, "What we
have said about a debtor's future receivables would seem to
apply with equal force to a debtor's future inventory." He
argues there is nothing in Article 9 inconsistent with the idea
that "earnings under future contracts are presently existing
'general intangibles.' "70
One embarrassment in regarding future property as a presently existing general intangible is that the 1952 official draft of
the Uniform Commercial Code contained no category for general
intangibles. 71 The Enlarged Editorial Board for Amendment of
Text of the U.C.C. in 1954 proposed the addition of the classification "general intangible" to § 9-106 because:
"The term 'general intangibles' brings under this Article
miscellaneous types of contractual rights and other personal
property which are used or may become customarily used
as commercial security. Examples are good will, literary
rights and rights to performance. Other examples are copyrights, trademarks and patents to the extent that they are
not regulated by statutes of the United States (See Section
9-104 (a)). This Article solves the problems of filing of security interests in these types of intangibles (Sections 9-103
(2) and 9-401(1) (d)). It should be noted that this catchall
definition does not apply to types of intangibles which are
specifically excluded from the coverage of Article 9 (Section
9-104)." 72
69 For a general discussion of the civil law device, a "mortgage on an estate

to come" and its common law acceptance, see Cohen and Gerber, The Afteracquired Property Clause, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1939).
70 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.5, p. 1307
(1965).
71 See § 9-106 U.C.C. 1952.
72 Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and Comments of the
Uniform Commercial Code, as amended by action of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at their respective meetings in 1954, p. 64.
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The recommended definition of general intangibles was accepted,
but the embarrassment springs from two factors. One, if the
Code drafters had intended that future property is a presently
existing general intangible, why did they not so provide in the
1952 and earlier drafts? And, two, if the amendment proposed
in 1954 was intended to include, in the category of general intangibles, future property, why did not the comments so state?
Surely, the problem of the after-acquired property clause and
the Bankruptcy Act was of sufficient importance that the problem should have been mentioned, if it in fact was dealt with. Its
omission somewhat weakens the argument we have been supporting but hardly destroys it.
One argument in favor of including, in the definition of general intangible, future property is what may be called the validation argument. The U.C.C. drafters clearly intended (see § 9-108
and comments thereto) that after-acquired property should be
invulnerable to attack in bankruptcy.7 3 Courts faced with an interpretation of the Code should, where two possible interpretations are possible, so interpret the Code as to effectuate its clear
intent.7 4 Unhappily this argument, whatever its worth, cannot
be applied to the definition of property in the Bankruptcy Act,
to which we now turn.
IV. Federal Property Definition
According to Collier,75 "(A) s a general proposition it has
been tersely stated that 'a transfer of property within the meaning of the bankruptcy law includes the, giving or conveying of
anything of value which has debt-paying or debt-securing
power.'" This definition is found in Pirie v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co.,75a a case concerned with the question whether money

is property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. The
Pirie case made it clear that the definition of property is a broad
Section 9-108 serves two functions. It provides a technical justification
which the courts may or may not accept. Further it makes pellucid Code
policy: "In any event, even if the definition adopted by § 9-108 is not accepted, the section clearly shows that the intent of the Uniform Commercial
Code is that a transfer such as the one involved here should not be considered a preferential one, and the Code's provisions as to perfection and attachment of security interests should not be interpreted to produce a different result." Rosenberg v. Rudnick, supra n. 59, at 639. See also § 1-102(1).
73

74

Id.

75

3 Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., para. 60.07, p. 791 (14th ed. 1969).
182 U.S. 438 (1901).

75a
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one, broad enough, it is submitted, to cover after acquired prop6
erty. Gordon writes: 7
"[T]rue, the Act does not define 'property,' and the author has found no federal case holding that a state-recognized
lien in after-acquired property is not a 'transfer of any of the
property of the debtor' within the meaning of Section 60.
In fact, the earlier equitable lien cases seemed to have
assumed that it is a transfer."
77
Gordon continues however that Local Loan Co. v. Hunt is

authority for holding that future property is not presently property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. His reliance on
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt is misplaced. In that case respondent
borrowed from petitioner the sum of $300 and executed an assignment of a portion of his wages thereafter to be earned.
Under the law of Illinois, the assignment of future wages constituted an enforceable lien. This view of the Supreme Court of
Illinois was a minority view, but the contention was made that
even though the general view be otherwise, the Supreme Court
is bound to follow the Illinois view, "since the question of the
existence of a lien depends upon Illinois law." 78 The Supreme
Court disagreed with this contention. It pointed out that the
Bankruptcy Act is paramount and that the purpose of that Act
is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and to permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes." 79 The Court said:

"The power of the individual to earn a living for himself
and those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal
liberty, quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property
right. To preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private
necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern."
(Emphasis supplied.) 8 0
Pauperism is seen by the Court as an outcome of the Illinois rule.
The Court concludes:
"Confining our determination to the case in hand and
leaving prospective liens upon other forms of acquisitions
to be dealt with as they may rise, we reject the Illinois de77

Gordon, supra, n. 62, at 1190.
292 U.S. 234 (1934).

78

Id. at 244.

79

Id.

76

80 Id. at 245.
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cisions as to the effect of an assignment of wages earned
after bankruptcy as being destructive of the purpose and
spirit of the bankruptcy act." 81
The action by the Supreme Court clearly shows that under certain circumstances, the definition of property will be determined
not only by what states denominate as property but also by a
federal element. Exactly when that federal element will be injected is difficult to judge. However, Local Loan does not stand
for the proposition that future inventory and future accounts
receivable are not present property within the meaning of the
federal Bankruptcy Act. A U.C.C. case closer to Local Loan
would be made if the secured party were claiming an interest
in inventory received by the debtor after the date of the petition.
Here, the fresh start argument would have some meaning, although the court in the last quoted sentence expressly refused
to decide whether it would extend the fresh-start argument beyond the question of future wages. Certainly, the arguments
about pauperism and the argument that we are concerned more
with liberty than property rights is ill suited for application to
the inventory and accounts receivable situation. Even if we
accept the worst, that future inventory and future accounts receivable are to be treated the same as future wages, the decision
is clearly distinguishable. Wages earned in the four months preceding bankruptcy were not considered by the court. The language of the opinion suggests that the Illinois law would have
been respected with regard to these wages. In the Code problem with the Bankruptcy Act, we are not concerned with inventory and accounts receivable generated after the petition in
bankruptcy has been filed, but with those in which the debtor
acquires rights during the four months prior to bankruptcy.
There is nothing in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt which compels an
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act which would invalidate
the floating lien.
The Local Loan case does stand for the proposition that
there is a federal component to the definition of property, which
component is derived from the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. Professor Gilmore points out:
82
"Federal law is generally intersticial in its nature.
"The most familiar example of the 'intersticial' character
81

Id.

Quoted from Hart and Wechsler, Federal Courts and the Federal System
435 (1953).
82
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of federal law is the Bankruptcy Act. In general Congress
has chosen to do no more than provide a mechanism for the
distribution of assets of insolvent estates, leaving to the
background of state law the determination of the validity
of property rights and other claims to the assets." 83
According to Professor Corbin "the term 'property' is an abused
term, seldom defined or subjected to careful analysis, and nearly
always used to obtain some desired end with variable underlying assumptions that are not expressed." 84 It is submitted that
if, on the basis of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme
Court should decide that after-acquired property interests should
be voidable in bankruptcy, a statement that future property is
not property would adequately describe its result. Such a statement, however, would clearly enunciate a rule of justification,
not a rule of guidance.8 5 Neither Local Loan nor any other case
warrants the inference that the amorphous word "property"
must be construed to strike down the U.C.C. interest in afteracquired property.
V. Termination of Vulnerability to Creditor Who Obtains Lien
on a Simple Contract
For purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code a critical
question, with respect to the after-acquired property clause, is
the timing of the transfer. The timing of the transfer is a matter
of federal law,86 but the federal formula incorporates as one of
its elements non-bankruptcy (in most cases, state) 8 7 rules of
priority. The Code may not be able to affect the time of the
transfer by its definition of antecedent debt (§ 9-108) nor by its
definition of perfection, but it is clearly within the province of
the state legislature to determine priorities between lien creditors
and secured parties. If, under Code priority rules, no subsequent
lien could become superior to the interest of the secured party,
then a transfer is deemed made under B.A. 60(a) (2). Unlike
the problem encountered in defining property supra, which has
1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 403 (1965).
A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 791. (Student ed. 1952.)
85 See G. Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice 71-73 (1968). See footnote 46 supra
for Gottlieb's definition of a guidance rule and a rule of justification.
86 Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a) (2) 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (2).
87 "The term 'state law' is frequently used as more concrete than 'applicable law' and less awkward than 'non-bankruptcy law."' J. MacLachlan,
Bankruptcy 297 (1956). The U.C.C. has been adopted in 49 states, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.
83
84
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a federal element, this aspect of the after-acquired property
problem is exclusively within the control of the legislative bodies
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Code rules of priority are stated in § 9-312 and other
sections to which § 9-312 refers. The only section referred to
which deals with the conflict between lien creditors and security
interests is § 9-301, which provides that:

"(1)

.

.

. an unper-

fected security interest is subordinate to the rights of . . . (b) a
person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected." (Emphasis supplied.) This subsection is an exception to U.C.C. § 9-201, which
reads: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against [lien] 88 creditors." (Emphasis supplied.) Sections 9-301 and 9-201, supported
by the official comment s9 to § 9-201, mean that one must obtain
a lien prior to perfection of a security interest in order to gain
rights equal or superior to the secured party. For if one obtains
a lien subsequent to perfection, or simultaneously therewith,
the exception of § 9-301 does not apply, and absent this exception
a security interest is "effective" against lien creditors under
§ 9-201. Can we be sanguine about this solution, or does complexity lurk beneath this simple facade? Would it have been
better if the Code had provided explicit priority rules in situations covering the after-acquired property security interest? It
might have provided, borrowing some language of § 9-108, the
following:
"Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an
obligation, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the
after-acquired collateral [shall have priority over subsequent liens upon such collateral obtained by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract] if the debtor acquires
his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of
88 "'Creditor' includes a . . . a lien creditor. . . ." U.C.C. § 1-201(12).
89 "In general the security agreement is effective between the parties; it is

likewise effective against third parties. Exceptions to this general rule arise
where there is a specific provision in any Article of this Act, for example,
where Article 1 invalidates a disclaimer of the obligations of good faith, etc.
(Section 1-102(3)), or this Article subordinates the security interest because
it has not been perfected (Section 9-301) or for other reasons (see Section
9-312 on priorities) or defeats the security interest where certain types of
claimants are involved (for example Section 9-307 on buyers of goods)."
(Emphasis added) Comment to § 9-201.
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his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant
to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given."
Such a provision would have forestalled various objections. For
example, Professor King, in addressing himself to the instant
problem, writes that its solution under the "so far perfected
test" of B.A. 60 (a) (2) "rests on the assumption that the security
interest attaches automatically and before the judgment lien
does. In fact, both attach simultaneously, so the answer is not
that clear." 90 (Emphasis supplied.) He continues that "Both
Professor Gilmore and Mr. Coogan see problems in the area of
intangible financing on this very issue and they conclude that
neither the Code nor the non-Code state law provides the
priority answers." 91 Professor Gilmore observes, "On general
principles it seems that the levy, attachment, garnishment or
what not has nothing to bite on until the moment when the
fund comes into existence and at that moment the security interest automatically attaches and becomes perfected." 92 He
adds, however, a cautionary note: "But the law of judgment
liens is a largely unexplored jungle and general principles may
not guarantee a safe passage." 93 Mr. Coogan also addresses himself to this problem.94 Mr. Coogan speaks to the situation where
the judgment creditor's interest and the secured party's interest
attach simultaneously when an account arises. He states that
"[n]o priority rule in the Code or CPLR [the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules] specifically governs this situation." 95
We return now to our hypothetical case, where the security
interest was perfected in January. In order to avoid the stigma
of antecedent debt, a transfer should be deemed made simultaneously with the extension of credit, which was extended, let
us say, on January 15. Under the test of § 60 (a) (2) the question
is whether any subsequent lien obtainable on a simple contract
could become superior to the rights of the transferee. The word
"subsequent" refers to a lien obtained subsequent to January 15,
90 King, § 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Does it Insulate the Trus-

tee from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. of Pa. Law R. 1117,
1133 (1966).
91 Id.
92 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in PersonalProperty § 12.9, p. 398 (1965).
93 Id.
94 Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1006 et seq. (1964).
95 Id. at 1016.
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when the original transaction was consummated. There are
three possibilities: first a lien which is obtained subsequent to
perfection, second a lien which is obtained simultaneously with
perfection and third a lien obtained prior to perfection (this may
be wholly a theoretical construct, since it is difficult to see how
a creditor of the debtor could obtain a lien on the collateral prior
to the time that the debtor obtained "rights in the collateral").
At this point, we must examine our temporal reference
point, the time when the debtor gets rights in the collateral
under § 9-204. This is not as clear as its enunciation might suggest. Ambiguity is injected by the difficulty of identifying collateral. Are we talking about the particular account or the particular component of inventory when we speak of the collateral?
Or are we speaking about the property interest classified as a
general intangible in the future inventory or the future accounts? 96 Resolution of this problem obviously has a bearing
on the priority rules, for the property interest in the general
intangible-future property-will be acquired simultaneously
with the extension of credit, and the only subsequent lien creditor who could attack the transaction would be one in the first
of our three indicated possibilities (supra, preceding paragraph)
namely, a lien creditor who obtained his lien after perfection. It
would seem on the basis of common sense that such creditor
clearly would lose out to the secured party. If a perfected security interest were subject under the Code to the rights of a
general creditor who attached or garnished, who obtained a
judgment and levied execution, etc., then Article 9 of the U.C.C.
would not be worth the paper it is written on. However, even
with regard to this problem, which is probably the simplest of
the priority problems between the secured creditor and a lien
97
creditor, two courts have had difficulty arriving at a result.
Neither court found any explicit solution in the Code. Both arrived at their result (favoring the secured party) by negative
inference and in each case the negative inference was based on
a different premise.

Before examining the two cases it might

96 A further difficulty is generated by the difficulty of timing, once collateral
has been identified. See Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens and Foolish
Creditors,17 Stan. L. Rev. 822 (1965). With respect to inventory, it may be
"identification" under § 2-501, passage of title, or the debtor obtaining possession. Id. Regarding accounts, the Code is explicit. No security interest
attaches until the account comes into existence. § 9-204(1) and (2) (d).
97 Rosenberg v. Rudnick, supra n. 59; Grain Merchants of Indiana v. The
Union Bank & Savings Co., supra n. 59.
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be well to consider a provision that was found in earlier drafts
of the Uniform Commercial Code, but has disappeared by the
time the 1952 draft appeared.
Section 1-102.1 had provided: "Where a section is silent on
a particular point, negative inference may be justified when the
reason of the situation requires or justifies such inference." 9s
The deletion of this section from the Code, it is submitted, adds
nothing to the way the Code will be interpreted. Obviously a
99
negative inference may always be drawn where appropriate.
The difficult question is, when is it appropriate? Layman Allen
points out that one of the most commonly overlooked ambiguities
in legal drafting is "whether the connection between two elements of a statement is intended to be or implication [if A, then
B] or a co-implication [if and only if A, then B]." 100 Since
our choice, where this ambiguity is present, is between two distinct major premises, the rationale of a case must go beyond the
mere statement that a negative inference was intended. Reason,
policy and purpose must be consulted. To say that sometimes a
listing in a statute or other legal document is exhaustive (exclusive) and that sometimes it is not (i.e., is inclusive) is but to
state the obvious. To decide, on the basis of a conclusion that
inclusiveness or exclusiveness was intended, is but to state a
result, while the reason for the decision remains inarticulate and
perhaps unconscious. We return now to the two cases previously mentioned.101

In Grain Merchants10 2 the Court looked to the U.C.C. and
not to the non-Code debt collection law to determine priorities.
The court stated that "the Code does not explicitly resolve this
problem" but that "we are persuaded by virtue of § 9-301 (1) (d)
taken in conjunction with § 9-204 (3) that a secured creditor who
has duly filed a financing statement covering after-acquired collateral is entitled to priority over a subsequent lien creditor
Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law
and Contemporary Problems, 330, 335 (1951).
99 "You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply
it?" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897).
100 Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 Yale L. J. 833, 855 (1957).
101 Supra n. 97.
102 Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. The Union Bank & Savings Co., 408
F.2d 209 (C.A. 7, 1969), cert. den. sub nom France, Trustee in Bankruptcy
v. Union Bank and Savings Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
98

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/1

26

Finan: Selected Preference Problems

SELECTED PREFERENCE PROBLEMS

seeking to levy on the same property." 103 The court added:
"(A) s soon as an account receivable comes into existence and
is sought to be attached by a lien creditor, it has already become subject to a perfected security interest-here that of the
bank. The very occurrence which gives rise to the full perfection of the security interest prevents the subsequent lien creditor
from obtaining a priority as to the property." 104 (emphasis
supplied). The court here was talking about priority only as
between the secured party and a lien creditor who obtains his
lien subsequent to full protection in the individual account
under the Code. 10 5 The Court did not address itself to the question of priorities between a lien creditor whose lien was obtained simultaneously with the bank's obtaining rights in the
collateral, which rights were obtained, according to the court,
when the accounts receivable came into existence.10 6
The opinion is to be lauded in that it looks to the Code to
decide the priority question. Allowing non-Code law to be controlling would destroy uniformity, which is one of the central
policies of the Code. 10 7 The Court is to be faulted, however,
for relying on § 9-301 (1) (d) when 9-301 (1) (b) is the applicable
section; and for suggesting that the Code rule is not explicitly
stated, despite the fact that under § 9-201 a perfected security
interest is effective against lien creditors. Section 9-201 does
not speak in terms of priorities, but it is difficult to find a meaning for the word "effective" if a subsequent lien "obtainable by
legal or equitable proceeding on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of [the secured party]." 108
In Rosenberg v. Rudnick,0 9 the defendant, Rudnick, made a
loan to Boyle Sundries Inc. in the amount of $110,000 on April
30, 1962. By a security agreement executed in connection with
Id. at 213.
Id.
105 In Grain Merchants, supra n. 102, the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code sought to link accounts receivable and inventory.
The security interest in the inventory was perfected prior to Sept. 20, and
hence was invulnerable to a preference attack. The Permanent Editorial
Board's contention, that the accounts billed after Sept. 20, 1966 were proceeds of inventory was not considered, since it had not been raised in the
district court.
100 See § 9-303 (1), 9-204 (1), 9-204(2) (d).
107 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (c).
103

104

108 B.A. § 60(a) (2).
109 Supra n. 59.
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. a security interest in all

the equipment, machinery, fixtures, inventory and accounts receivable of the debtor, together with all additions thereto and
all property now or hereafter substituted therefor or otherwise
acquired in the ordinary course of business." 110 On the issue of
priorities between the holder of this security interest and lien
creditors, the Court stated that perfection under state law (applicable non-bankruptcy law) need not be full perfection but
only perfection "so far as is necessary to meet the test of
§ 60 (a) (2)."
"While the Massachusetts law may not regard a security
interest in after-acquired inventory as fully perfected until
it attaches to items as they are acquired by the debtor,
nevertheless § 9-204 (3) recognizes that a lien in such inventory items can be validly created by a security agreement.
Such a lien, after proper compliance with the filing provisions, is superior to all subsequently acquired contract
creditor's liens or other claims of third parties except the
rights of buyers in the ordinary course of business under
§ 9-307 (1) and holders of perfected purchase money security
interest under § 9-312 (3). In this case the security interest
was created by the execution of the security agreement on
April 30, 1962 and the subsequent compliance with the filing
provisions. As of that date the security interest met with
the requirements of § 60 (a) (2) and the transfer must be regarded as having taken place on that date." 110a
It should be noted that the temporal reference used by the court
in talking about subsequent lien creditors is not the date of full
perfection but the date when the security interest was created
by the execution of the security agreement."' It is not clear
why the Court, in reaching this decision, did not rely on U.C.C.
§ 9-201. The Court seems to be saying that since §§ 9-307 (1) and
9-312(3) are the exclusive sections which allow defeat of a
110 Id.at 636.
110a Id. at 638.
111 Under B.A. § 60(a) (7) a transfer is deemed made when the actual transfer is made if filing is accomplished within 21 days (or less if required by
state law, i.e. 10 days re purchase money security interest, § 9-301(2)).
Thus if a security interest is granted on January 15 and credit is simultaneously extended, the transfer is deemed made on January 15 even though
the security interest is not made invulnerable against lien creditors for a
period of up to 21 days. If the 21 days, or shorter applicable period, before
a necessary filing (or other necessary overt act), is exceeded, then the
"deemed made" provision of § 60 (a) (2) is applicable, there is a transfer for
an antecedent debt, and the security interest is vulnerable, if bankruptcy
occurs within four months of the overt act.
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perfected security interest, therefore, by implication, a lien creditor not included in either of these sections must be subordinate.
The writer has earlier noted his objections to this type of reasoning.
It should also be noted that the Court did not address itself
to the "linked" collateral solution of the priority problem. This
solution is best studied in a concrete situation. Assume a security interest is perfected on January 15, 1969, in present and
future accounts, and account No. 113 comes into existence on
December 15, within four months of bankruptcy (petition is
filed December 31). What are the relative rights of the secured
party and a creditor who obtained his lien upon a simple contract on December 15, simultaneously with the accounts birth?
If the perfected security interest in the account is dated from
December 15, then the lien and the security interest arose simultaneously. If such a simultaneously-arising lien is superior to
the rights of the secured party, then perfection is deemed postponed, under B.A. 60 (a) (2), until after the birth of the account.
In this context the question of the simultaneous perfection
priority problem is important. Another approach may be taken,
however. The account, No. 113, can be treated as proceeds of
its antecedents. Its most remote antecedent is the general intangible, future accounts, which arose on January 15. Under
§ 9-306 (3) a security interest in proceeds is ".

.

. a continuously

perfected security interest if the interest in the original collateral
was perfected. . .

."

Thus we may date the security interest in

account No. 113 back to January 15. So dated, it would be
superior to the lien obtained in December. So dated, we need
not be concerned about simultaneous perfection, because under
B.A. 60(a) (2) the federal formula only speaks of subsequent
liens. It is possible to link collateral but not date the security
interest back to its most remote antecedent. For example, the
linking argued for in Grain Merchants extended back only to inventory. 112 And linking may be rejected, so we turn now to the
question of the priority of a secured party whose security was
perfected simultaneously with a competing lien upon a simple
contract.
Sections 9-201 and 9-301 (1) (b) in the writer's opinion give
priority to the secured party, but a reading of the literature con112

Supra n. 105.
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tinues to inject a nagging doubt. 113 Prior to the adoption of the
U.C.C., the solution to priority problems was less clear than
it now appears. A search of the digests for a case where mortgages or other consensual security interests arose simultaneously
with the interest of a lien creditor upon a simple contract has
proven frustrating. In the United States, many jurisdictions follow the rule that "delivery of a writ of execution to the sheriff
creates a lien on the judgment debtor's chattels within the officer's bailiwick. .

.

. A growing number of states defer the

creation of a lien until an actual levy . .
," 114 In the latter
states, in order for there to be a simultaneous perfection, the
creditor competing with the secured party would have to levy
on the goods simultaneously with the secured party's acquisition
of rights in the collateral. Such a feat is indeed deft, even for
our hypothetical lien creditor, for although the Bankruptcy Act
gives the trustee the benefit of state law under any conceivable
set of facts, it is somewhat difficult to conceive of a fact situation
in the "levy" states where the liens will arise simultaneously. It
is less improbable to have simultaneously-arising liens in those
states where the delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff
determines the time of the lien. Muson v. Commercial State
Bank" 5 is such a case. The writ of execution was delivered to
the sheriff on June 2, 1926, at 4:30 P.M. A chattel mortgage was
filed for record on the same date at 4:30 P.M. Here there was
the simultaneous arising of a lien and a mortgage and on a trial
of right, it was held that the burden is upon the claimant, that
is, the chattel mortgagee, to prove his right to the property.
Since he failed to show a superior right, he failed. Under this
case, a lien creditor did in fact get rights superior to the chattel
mortgagee. Under the Uniform Commercial Code this could not
happen. Regardless of whether one is in a "levy" state or a
state where the issuance of the writ determines the time of the
lien, or in some other state," 6 the secured party would have
rights superior to the lien creditor, since under U.C.C. § 9-201
his security interest is effective against lien creditors. This language is sufficiently clear to solve the concurrent lien problem;
H. Marsh, Book review of Security Interests In Personal Property by G.
Gilmore, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 898, 908 (1965).
114 S. _Riesenfeld, Creditors' Remedies and Debtors' Protection 100, 101
(1967).
115 246 Ill. App. 369 (1927).
116 See Riesenfeld, supra n. 114.
113
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and if any doubt exists, resort to policy confirms this interpretation, since a different interpretation would imperil the afteracquired property security interest, an interest which the Code
clearly seeks to preserve. We turn now to the theoretical construct, possibility three (supra p. 117).
Some statutes bind the debtor's property from the time the
writ of execution is delivered to the sheriff. Suppose a security
interest is granted in future property on January 15, a writ of
execution is issued on June 1, and the debtor gets rights in the
property on June 9. The sheriff levies on June 9 after, or possibly simultaneously with the debtor's obtaining rights in the
property. Statutes provide that when possession is taken there
is a relation back to the time when the writ of execution was
delivered to the sheriff. Thus the lien under the execution writ
would date from June 1, while the lien under the after-acquired
property clause would date from June 9. Two approaches may
be taken in dealing with this problem. If one assumes that the
collateral levied upon constitutes proceeds of the general intangible-future property-in which a security agreement was
perfected prior to June 1, then the secured party has priority
over the execution lien, since under § 9-306 (3) "[a] security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest."
If the proceeds argument is rejected, it might be possible to argue
that the lien obtained upon a simple contract is superior. This
would be a disastrous result under B.A. 60 (a) (2), and an interpretation that seems unreasonable, since there should be no relation back to a time before the debtor obtained rights in the
collateral. One case so holds i 17 and is authority for the conclusion that the interests would be concurrent. The court reasons:
"There is no proof showing that the property seized was the
property of the judgment debtor when the execution was originally issued or at any time until the actual levy was made. A
lien could not attach to a thing not in being." 117a (emphasis supplied). Under § 679 of the Civil Practice Act of New York, the
statute effective and applicable at the time of the case, goods
were bound by the execution "from the time of delivery thereof
to the proper officer to be executed." However, the relation back
to the time of such delivery occurred only when the judgment
117 In re Laskaris, 4 F. Supp. 652 (Dist. Ct. W. District of N.Y. 1933). See
also, regarding intangibles, Riesenfeld, supra n. 114, at 167.
117a

Id; at 653.
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debtor had property subject to execution at the time the writ of
execution was delivered. If a judgment debtor does not acquire
such property until the exact time that the debtor has rights in
the collateral within the meaning of § 9-204, no lien obtained
by the execution would be superior to the perfected security interest. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the interests attach simultaneously and that, under § 9-201 as discussed previously, a perfected security interest is superior to a
lien on a simple contract which is perfected simultaneously. Of
course, it would be possible for a court to decide that a judgment
debtor had sufficient rights in the collateral to support an execution, but not sufficient rights in the collateral to have a perfected
security interest within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial
Code §§ 9-303 and 9-204. Although such perversity is theoretically possible, it is offensive to the policy of the Code and
seems to be such a sufficiently remote contingency that it may be
118
safely discounted.
VI. Increases in Collateral During the Four Month Period
Preceding Bankruptcy
The above analysis suggests that, in the ordinary situation
where the accounts receivable and the inventory decline during
the four months preceding bankruptcy, there is safety. But
what of the situation where there is an increase, whether in the
ordinary course of business or out of the ordinary course of
business? Let us take the last situation first. Assume in our
continuing hypothetical case that there is a security interest
entered into on January 15. Value is given on January 15, and
the debtor obtains rights in all present and future accounts.
Good practice dictates that filing should antedate the attachment and we may assume that filing took place on January 14,
although under § 60 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act, filing may be
postponed for a period of not more than 21 days (perhaps less,
depending on state law) without affecting the rule that the
118 § 10-103-General repealer, provides, with exceptions not relevant here,
that "all acts and parts of act inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed." Does this not argue for repeal of any non-Code statute which
would give such a priority to a lien, obtained upon a simple contract, that
the Code would be vulnerable in Bankruptcy. "This Act" within the meaning of § 10-103 surely includes § 9-108, and probably the basic policy of the
Code in general. As for non-Code statutes passed subsequent to the Code
-§ 1-104 provides a rule of construction against implicit repealer. Express
priority rules defeating the Code interest are possible, but unlikely to be
passed.
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transfer is deemed to be made on January 15. Let us assume,
now, that during the four months preceding bankruptcySeptember, October, November and December-collateral increases. The accounts receivable may increase for any number
of reasons including a slowing down of the debt payment,i.e. average accounts may go from 60 days to 90 or 120 days.
Or inventory may be increased, whether or not in the ordinary
course of business. In the latter situation, where collateral is
increased not in the ordinary course of business, the Code affords
little protection. Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code
reads:
"Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an
obligation, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the
after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for
new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the
debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the
ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a
reasonable time after new value is given."
According to Professor Gilmore:
"By necessary implication Section 9-108 says that afteracquired property interests of any other type are, as a matter of state law, antecedent debt transfers. We may assume
that a transfer which, at the state law level, is stigmatized
as being one for antecedent debt would also be one at the
federal law level." 119

Although exactly what is meant by the phrase "ordinary course
of business" may not be clear, certain situations suggest themselves as not falling within that term. One possibility is that a
debtor, desiring to favor a particular secured party, would
rapidly increase his inventory during the four month period
prior to bankruptcy in order to give the secured party more of
a return in bankruptcy. Of course, if the security agreement
were set up, as many are, so that the amount of the loan has a
conservative ratio to the amount of the security (loan is limited
to 80% of the value of security), this temptation would not be
present. However, in a situation where the debt exceeds the
value of the security and the secured party is a favored creditor,
the debtor might well use assets which should be available to
119 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.6, 1313-1314
(1965).
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general creditors under the equality of distribution rule to purchase material covered by the security interest. Such an increase in collateral would be a benefit, condemned by both the
policy of the Bankruptcy Act and the policy of the Code. The
offense to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is obvious. Feeding
the lien in this manner is one of the most blatant types of preference, clearly calculated to destroy equality of distribution. It
is likewise contrary to the policy of the Code, as implied by
§ 9-108. If the Code drafters had provided that property not
protected by § 9-108 should be either (a) not subject to the security agreement, or (b) vulnerable to a lien creditor on a
simple contract, there is no question that the Bankruptcy Court
would recognize the Code's determination. However, under the
Code, there is a valid security interest in such property and
under the Code, if the above analysis is correct (the analysis
of the priorities based on §§ 9-201 and 9-301), the offending security interest in the property in question is covered by the
security interest under the after-acquired property clause and
is also invulnerable to attack by a lien creditor on a simple
contract. In Re Crosstown Motors120 and In Re Harpeth Motors121 demonstrate that while the states may affect the outcome

in bankruptcy by changing, not labels, but operative results under state law, which operative results are made part of a bankruptcy formula they may not directly affect a bankruptcy outcome. It seems unlikely that a court will ever uphold the security
interest in the type of property we are discussing. However, had
the Code adjusted its priority rules to fit its policy expressed
in § 9-108, a decision reflecting such a policy choice would be
easier to justify. As things stand, the court will have to decide,
despite the rather plain language in § 9-201 and § 9-301 U.C.C.,
that the Code's policy dictates subordinating rights of secured
parties in such property not only to the bankruptcy trustee but
to all lien creditors on a simple contract.
VI. Increase in Ordinary Course of Business
A more serious question involves the fact situation where
the increase in property during the four months preceding bankruptcy is a result of a transaction in the ordinary course of
business or possibly under a contract of purchase made pursuant
120
121

272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 363 U.S. 811 (1969).
135 F. Supp. 863 (NJ). Tenn., 1955).
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to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given. With respect to an increase in inventory in the
ordinary course of business prior to bankruptcy, the so-farperfected test of § 60 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act clearly supports the validity of a security interest. Section 9-108 likewise
provides support for such interest. There is some doubt, however. In Rosenburg v. Rudnick,122 the plaintiff argued that the
court should consider the inventory as a whole and:
"If it can be shown that there was an increase in the total
value of the inventory, between certain dates within the
four month period, this increase in value should be attributed to the goods acquired during that period and that a
preference to the extent of the increased value of the inventory had been shown." 123
The court rejected plaintiff's contention on the ground that no
increase was in fact shown, leaving for further consideration the
question of whether, had such an increase been shown even in
the ordinary course of business, there would have been a prefer124
ence to the extent of the increase. The Grain Merchants case
has language even more chilling to those who have a security
interest in collateral which increases during the four month
period prior to bankruptcy. The Court points out that since the
dominion rule of Benedict v. Ratner1 25 is no more, having been
overturned by § 9-205, it is no longer appropriate to apply strict
timing or value rules 126 in relying on the substitution-of-collateral doctrine. This doctrine can support the after-acquired
property interest in collateral "so long as at all relevant times
the total pool of collateral, as here, exceeded the total debt." 127
The Court finds noteworthy the two-pronged test suggested by
the National Bankruptcy Conference, which provides that
". .. transfers of receivables, pursuant to security agreement
within four months of bankruptcy will not constitute preferences
122

262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass., 1967).

123

Id. at 640.
Supra n. 102.
268 U.S. 353 (1925).

124
125

126 The Court's footnote 10 states, "The timing rule is that the new collateral must be transferred to the secured party either prior to or contemporaneously with the release of old collateral. The value rule is that if the
new collateral is of no greater value than the collateral which is released,
a voidable preference to the extent of the difference in value will result."
408 F.2d 209, 217 (1969).
127 Grain Merchants supra n. 102, 217.
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if they arose in the ordinary course of the debtor's business." 128
The above test accords with § 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, but there is a proposed two-point test, which provides that
"there will be a preference to the extent that the aggregate value
of the receivables subject to the security agreement on the date
of filing the bankruptcy petition exceeds the aggregate value
subject to the security agreement four months earlier." 129 The
court concludes:
"Here the pool of accounts receivable was remarkably
steady in aggregate value throughout the entire period of
the security agreement . . . . justifying the applicability of

the substitution of collateral principle to these facts. Hence,
for this additional reason, we conclude that there was no
forbidden preference." 130
It is difficult to read the above quoted language without coming
to the conclusion that if collateral is exceeded by the total debt
and there is an increase, even in the ordinary course of business,
during the four months preceding bankruptcy, this Court would
find a preference to the extent of the increase. Such conclusion
violates the policy of the Code expressed in § 9-108 and does not
seem to be mandated by any policies of the Bankruptcy Act.
The language in B.A. 60 (a) (2) dictates a contrary result. Perhaps we should not be overly concerned with this dictum because
the problem is not acute as a practical matter. A secured party
in extending credit does not rely on an increase in collateral in
ordinary course on the eve of bankruptcy, so this dictum is
unlikely to affect lending practice. If in fact, collateral does increase (as is more than possible in seasonal businesses) there is
a substantial chance of victory against the trustee, despite the
dictum discussed above.
This paper is concerned with two basic problems as far as
the after-acquired property clause is concerned. One is the
so-far-perfected test of § 60 (a) (2) which has been discussed.
The other is the problem of an attack under the equitable lien
section of the Bankruptcy Act, § 60 (a) (6). Before the equitable
lien section is discussed, some general comments on the cases
to date seem in order. The cases have talked about the so
"far-perfected" test. They have also relied on other tests. For
example, both Grain Merchants and Rosenburg v. Rudnick
128

129
130

Id. at 217, 218.
Id. at 218.
Id.
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accepted as an alternate rationale the entity theory, whereas the
DuBay v. Williams'31 case declined resort to the entity theory,
in rejecting the trustee's argument. Probably the distinguishing
feature of all the decisions is a disposition to do the will of the
legislatures which enacted the Code so far as that will is consistent, not with the words of Congress, but with the policy
exhibited by the Bankruptcy Act. Finding no clash between
the wording of the Code and the policy of the Bankruptcy Act,
the courts have upheld the Act, at least to the extent of not
avoiding security interests in after-acquired property where the
property did ntt expand in the four month period prior to bankruptcy. This, in the writer's opinion, is the most important area,
and hopefully the Supreme Court eventually, and other lower
Courts in the meanwhile, will protect the Code, at least in this
area.
The Equitable Lien Problem
Section 60(a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if a
lien is a "bad equitable lien" then such transfer is not perfected
within the meaning of paragraph 2.132 Professor MacLachlan, the
author of the equitable lien section, has written:
"Where a delivery, a recording, or the like, is required
by applicable law for the full validity of such a transfer
against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade, claiming through or under the transferor,
and where such overt act has not been taken, such a transfer
is regarded as not perfected, whether or not it gives rise to
an 'equitable lien.' "133 (Emphasis supplied.)
VI.

Professor Gilmore has said: "A perfectly possible construction
of § 60 (a) (6) is that any interest which could have been perfected against purchasers, but was not, is an invalid equitable
lien." 134 Professor Gilmore further states:
"If it is true that any interest in after-acquired property
is, as a rule of federal law, a section 60 (a) (6) equitable lien,
then the Article 9 after-acquired property interest is quite
clearly a bad equitable lien which does not escape condemnation under the second sentence." 135
131
132
133

134
135

6 U.C.C. Rep. 885 (1969).
Par. 2 of § 60 (a) B.A.
MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1390, 1394 (1950).
2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.8, 1335 (1965).
Id. at § 45.7, 1321.
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If we read together the language of the author of the Bankruptcy
Act provision, Professor MacLachlan, and the language of Professor Gilmore, one of the principal draftsmen of Article 9 and
perhaps the country's leading authority on that Article, we arrive
at a rather unhappy conclusion. Professor MacLachlan says that
if the lien is "bad" it need not be an equitable lien to be vulnerable under § 60 (a) (6). Professor Gilmore says that if it is an
equitable lien, it is necessarily bad. Putting the two comments
together it is difficult to see how the interest in the after-acquired
property can escape § 60 (a) (6) B.A., even if it successfully runs
the gauntlet of § 60 (a) (2) B.A. under the "so-far-perfected test,"
"entity test" or other tests which we have discussed. What is an
equitable lien? According to Mr. Earl, "[T]he words 'equitable
lien' are intensely undefined." 116 We are told in an article by
Cohen & Gerber 37 that the civil law recognized a "mortgage on
an estate to come" and that Justice Storey, one of the greatest
students of the civil law, was the first on the bench to "establish
the precedent in Anglo-American law that future property may
be presently charged." 138 This article quotes Storey as stating
that "[a]lthough it was true that future property could not be
presently charged at common law, nevertheless equity would
enforce the agreement." 139 A reading of the Article as a whole
suggests that, where recognized, a present interest in afteracquired property was indeed an equitable interest. Does this
background stigmatize an interest in after-acquired property as
an equitable lien? Probably not. The common law is subject
to change by statute, and the Uniform Commercial Code has
denominated a present interest in future property a legal interest. 140 Thus, prior characterization as an equitable lien seems
to be irrelevant. Nor is any reason evident why a federal court
should find in the term "equitable lien" used in § 60 (a) (6) of
the Bankruptcy Act a direction from Congress to establish an
independent federal test which would invalidate the "floating
lien."
In an article written in 1951 Professor Countryman lists four
criteria which may be used in determining what is an equitable
Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & El. 19, 27, 121 Eng. Rep. 8 (Q.B. 1859).
Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 635 (1939).
138 Id. at 636.
139 Id. at 637.
140 § 9-204 Official Comment 2.
136

137
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lien. 141 In applying these tests to a non-possessory lien which
can be perfected without filing under § 9-302, it is certainly arguable that the lien is equitable (for it is a secret lien), and there
is a possibility that this equitable lien is a "bad equitable lien." 142
The characterization is not as clear respecting filed, and therefore
non-secret interests in future property. However, an attorney
defending against an attack under § 60 (a) (6) of the Bankruptcy
Act would be ill-advised to limit his defense to the contention
that his security interest is not an equitable lien, given ProfesCountryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 16 Law and Contemp. Prob.
76, 96 (1951). He asks whether it is confined to "those 'judge-made' liens
which cannot be classified as common law possessory liens? Does it include
consensual liens which a statute, like the Code . . . gives some but not full
protection against third persons even though not accompanied by possession
or filing. Does it extend to liens created by statute the enforcement of
which often comes within 'the equity jurisdiction'? Or, in view of the
draftsmen's concern with 'secret liens,' should the term be construed to apply to all 'security interest based neither on possession nor on public record.'" (Footnotes omitted.)
142 A good example of the workings of § 60 (a) (6) B.A. can be shown if we
assume that a security interest, perfected without filing or the taking of possession under § 9-302, is an equitable lien. § 9-302 provides that "A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except. . . ." The
exceptions include, naturally enough, collateral in the possession of the secured party but also include non-possessory interests. § 9-302(c) and (d)
permit perfection of a security interest, without filing, in certain farm equipment and in consumer goods, if the interest is a purchase money security
interest. The perfection afforded to such purchase money security interests
is not as good as perfection by filing, for the purchase money man, unless
he files, is subject to certain buyers, under § 9-307(2) which provides:
"(2) In the case of consumer goods and in the case of farm equipment having an original purchase price not in excess of $2500 (other
than fixtures, see Section 9-313), a buyer takes free of a security interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security
interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes or his own farming operations unless prior to the purchase the
secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods."
The assumption that the security interests made vulnerable by § 9-306(2)
are equitable liens is reasonable. They are secret, non possessory interests.
Are they vulnerable to "third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade." B.A. 60(a) (6). I think the answer is clearly yes at least
in the case of consumer goods bought for the buyer's own personal, family
or household purposes. [Gilmore (2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property 1332 fn 10) raises the question under 60 (a) (6) B.A. of the vulnerability of security interests subject to defeat under § 9-307(2) and makes no
distinction between consumer goods and farm equipment.] On the above
assumptions the security interest is a "bad equitable lien" because: under
the second sentence of 60 (a) (2), applicable law, the Code, requires an overt
act, filing, as a condition of the security interest's full validity against third
persons other than buyers in the ordinary course of trade; by hypothesis
such overt action has not been taken; and also by hypothesis, the purchase
money secured party acquires only an equitable lien. Therefore, the transfer of the security interest is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph
(2) of section 60(a) of the B.A.
141
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sor MacLachlan's comments supra and the amorphous definitions of equitable liens. Professor Gilmore says § 60 (a) (6) B.A.
defeats you if your security interest is not characterized as a
legal interest. We will now analyze § 60 (a) (6) B.A. on the assumption that a security interest in future property is equitable.
Because of the language difficulties involved, it seems worthwhile to set forth § 60 (a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act in full:
"The recognition of equitable liens where available
means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is
hereby declared to be contrary to the policy of this section.
If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt action
as a condition to its full validity against third persons other
than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade claiming
through or under the transferor and (B) such overt action
has not been taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then such transfer is not
perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the first sentence of paragraph (2), it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an equitable lien
such as is described in the first sentence of paragraph (6),
that it is made for a valuable consideration and that both
parties intend to perfect it and that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract: Provided, however,
that where the debtor's own interest is only equitable, he
can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate
fully to transfer an interest of that character: And provided
further, that nothing in paragraph (6) shall be construed to
be contrary to the provisions of paragraph (7)." 143
In analyzing B.A. § 60 (a) (6), §§ 9-307, 9-312 (3), & (4) are relevant. Section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code declares:
"A buyer in the ordinary course of business .

.

. [with the

exception of certain purchasers of farm products] takes free
of a security interest created by a seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence."
This provision presents no difficulty, for § 60 (a) (6) B.A. requires only full validity against third persons other than a buyer
in the ordinary course of trade. A buyer in the ordinary course
of business under the Uniform Commercial Code1 44 is a type of
buyer in the ordinary course of trade within the meaning of the
143
144

B.A. 60 (a)(6).
§ 1-201(9).
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Bankruptcy Act, and so little trouble is given on this score.' 4 5
However, under the Code a purchase money security interest in
inventory collateral (U.C.C. § 9-312 (3)) and a purchase money
security interest in collateral other than inventory (§ 9-312 (4))
has priority over the holder of a security interest in afteracquired property, if certain conditions are met. It is this § 9-312
vulnerability that troubles Professor Gilmore. He writes that
even if the Article 9 requirements for validity and perfection
have been complied with and the "overt action" has been taken,
there is still trouble in the language of clause (A) (B.A. 60
(a) (6) (A))
"which seems to mean that when the overt action has
been taken the result must be that the lien (if it is to be
saved) will have 'full validity against third persons other
than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade.' The Article
9 after-acquired property interest, even if perfected, does not
have that degree of 'validity': it runs the risk of subordination to subsequent purchase money interests ....
,, 146
Gilmore speculates that, had the draftsmen of the Code been
given the benefit of hindsight, they might have drafted the clause
to say: "[A]s a condition to its full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade or the
holder of a purchase money security interest .... ,, 147 But he
writes that the "draftsmen had never heard of a statute which
expressly validated the after-acquired property interest but subordinated it to a subsequent purchase-money interest; there
was no such statute." 148 And he uses this as an illustration of
what he means when he says that § 60 (a) (6) and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code "belong to different universes of discourse." 149
Assuming the existence of different universes of discourse,
is there any way to interpret the language of § 60 (a) (6) so that
the equitable interest in future property is not a "bad equitable
lien"? The first sentence of § 60 (a) (6) talks about the recognition of equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal
liens have not been employed. Such recognition is declared to
be "contrary to the policy of this section." If, as we are assuming
145
146

Id. Official Comment 9.
2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.7, 1321 (1965).

147

Id. at 1322.

148

Id. at 1321, 1322.

149

Id. at 1322.
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arguendo, an interest in future property is an equitable interest,
the policy of the Act is not subverted, since there is no way of
perfecting a legal interest in such future property. Turning to
the second sentence of § 60 (a) (2), the Bankruptcy Act requires
an overt act, if applicable law requires such an act. Applicable
law (the U.C.C.) requires filing or possession to protect some
security interests against buyers not in the ordinary course of
trade (i.e. holders of non-purchase money security interests).
However, since we are assuming filing with respect to a security
interest in future property, and since applicable law (the Code)
does not require-indeed it does not even authorize-an overt
act other than filing for full validity of security interests in
"future property" against purchase money security interests
complying with § 9-312 (3) and (4) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it is no violation of the requirements of the second sentence for the secured party to fail to do an act which is impossible. 150 The writer is assuming that the debtor's reducing
future property to present property is not considered an applicable overt act. Section 60(a) (6) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act
talks about "a signed and delivered writing," a "delivery of possession" (to the secured party), a filing or recording or other
like overt action, and it would seem to be a bizarre interpretation of the Act to say that future property must be reduced to
present property to avoid attack under § 60 (a) (6).151 The fairest
reading of § 60 (a) (6), in the context of our problem, is that if
there is no applicable law under which full validity against purchase money security interest can be obtained, then no overt action need be taken, and the equitable lien is a valid equitable
52
lien.1
Assuming the worst, assuming that the Supreme Court
should decide that a security interest in after-acquired property
is a bad equitable lien, is there anything a draftsman can do
to avoid falling under the condemnation of such a holding? In
describing collateral, draftsmen provide for a security interest
in present and after-acquired collateral. Suppose the draftsmen
150 Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
151 A requirement that a debtor increase his inventory by buying all inventory presently, calls for sheer madness. Ejus generis suggests that the language "like overt act" requires no such absurdity.
152 Basically the major premise of 60(a) (6) has three conjunctive elements
in its antecedent. The consequent is invalidity. Deny any one of the three
antecedent elements and you deny the antecedent, on the affirmance of
which the consequent depends.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/1

42

Finan: Selected Preference Problems

SELECTED PREFERENCE PROBLEMS

provided for an interest in present and after-acquired collateral,
but limited the description so as to exclude collateral obtained by
the debtor subject to a purchase money security interest unless
and until the purchase money secured party had failed to perform
those actions necessary to give such purchase money secured
party priority under § 9-312 (3) and (4). Such a provision would
give us a security interest in after-acquired property which is
not subject to a purchase money security interest. For the scope
of the security claimed would not include property subject to be
defeated by a purchase money interest. If § 60 (a) (6) should
become a serious threat, such a provision may indeed become
necessary. But does not the suggestion for the express inclusion
of such a provision suggest another argument for avoiding Bankruptcy Act § 60 (a) (6) vulnerability? Even if a security interest
has no express exclusion with respect to purchase money security interests, would it not be reasonable to attribute to the
draftsmen of the security agreement an intent not to include,
within the description of the collateral, property in which they
could have no rights under the U.C.C., when such inclusion
might invalidate the entire security agreement under the Bankruptcy Act? Such a construction of after-acquired property
clauses seems eminently reasonable, and coupled with the analysis we have made of § 60 (a) (6) suggests that, even should
courts decide that the interest in future property is equitable in
nature, such equitable interests would not be vulnerable under
§ 60 (a) (6).
IX. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (7) and the Uniform Commercial
Code
Under § 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, "(A) financing statement may be filed before a security agreement
is made or a security interest otherwise attaches." It is good
practice to do this because, with respect to non-purchase money
security interests, the failure to file prior to attachment means
that between the time of attachment and the time of filing, assuming filing is necessary to perfect the security interest, the
interest is subject to the rights of a person who becomes a lien
creditor without knowledge of the security interest. 15 3 With respect to purchase money interests, "(I) f the secured party
files . . . before or within ten days after the collateral comes
153

§ 9-301(1) (b).
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into the possession of the debtor, he takes priority over the rights
of a transferee in bulk or a lien creditor which arise between
the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing." 14
If filing takes place on the eleventh day, then the purchase
money security interest has been vulnerable to lien creditors for
the period between attachment and filing. Since vulnerability
to lien creditors under § 9-301 postpones the time when the transfer will be deemed to take place under § 60 (a) (2) B.A., there
is a possibility of harsh application of the Bankruptcy Act when
there is a minor delay. To alleviate this harshness," 55 § 60 (a) (7)
(I) B.A. provides that if the recording, delivery or other act
which is required by applicable law, in our case state law, is accomplished within 21 days or such shorter period as applicable
law requires, then such ".

.

. transfer shall be deemed to be

made or suffered at the time of the transfer." 156 This provision
only makes sense when read together with § 60 (a) (2). Section
60 (a) (2) provides that the operative transfer (for purposes of
§ 60 (a) and (b)) is not the actual transfer but the transfer
deemed to be made according to a certain formula. Section
60(a) (7) provides that when certain conditions are met this
operative transfer shall be deemed to be the actual transfer,
thus neutralizing § 60 (a) (2). In other words, § 60 (a) (2) deems
that the transfer under § 60 (a) does not take place until filing,
in the case of a security interest which may only be perfected
by filing, and § 60 (a) (7) deems a transfer back again to the time
of the original grant of a security interest. Section 60 (a) (7) of
the Bankruptcy Act yields peculiar results when it is framed
against § 9-304 of the Code.
Section 9-304 (4) of the Code provides, "(A) security interest in instruments or negotiable documents is perfected without
filing or the taking of possession for a period of 21 days from the
time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given
under a written security agreement." Professor Gilmore suggests
that § 60 (a) (7) B.A. is talking about a sort of grace period which
does not include the automatic perfection under § 9-304 (4) .17
If a statute provided that if there is recording or some other
overt act within x number of days of a grant of security, then
§ 9-301 (2).
155 J.MacLachlan, Handbook of the Law of Bankruptcy 307 (1956).
156 B.A. 60(a) (7) (I).
157 G. Gilmore, supra n. 134, at 1333.
154

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/1

44

Finan: Selected Preference Problems

SELECTED PREFERENCE PROBLEMS

the lien is good from the time of the actual transfer (actual
grant), that would be the type of statute contemplated by
§ 60 (a) (7) B.A. Under such a statute the 21 or less days (x
days) would begin to run from the first day that the lien or
security interest or whatever would be vulnerable to lien creditors but for the subsequent overt act. Since under the Code,
§ 9-304 (4), the perfection for a period of 21 days is complete
perfection and there is no vulnerability to lien creditors during
those days regardless of a future act, Professor Gilmore suggests
that it could be argued (on a high level of technicality) that the
21-day period begins to run on the 22nd day, thus giving the
secured party 42 days to perform the required overt act. He
rejects such a technical argument on the basis that it is not
justified on any policy ground. 158 It is arguably not justified on
the language of the Bankruptcy Act either. There are three
times made relevant by § 60 (a) (7). For purposes of convenience
they shall be referred to as T1, T2, T3.159 The 21 (or less) -day
period is measured from T1, the time of actual transfer, and no
transfer takes place at the termination of the 21-day period provided for in § 9-304 (4). Hence it is not consistent with the
language of the Bankruptcy Act to count 21 days beginning
there.
A more serious problem is presented by § 9-304 (5). Occasionally a secured party must release security for various
purposes. The Act recognizes the validity of such releases by
providing in UCC 9-304 (5) that:
"A security interest remains perfected for a period of
21 days without filing where a secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument, a negotiable docu158

Id.

159 T1 = time of actual transfer.
T2 = time by which, under applicable law, recording, delivery, or some
other act is required in order that no lien obtainable by legal or equitable
proceeding upon a single contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.
T3 = time within which under B.A. required recording or delivery or
other act must be accomplished in order that the transfer shall be deemed
to be made or suffered at the time of transfer.
If T2 = 21 or less days after the transfer, then T2 = T3.
If T2 = 21 plus days, then T3 = 21 days.
Thus if T2 =30 days,
T3 = 21 days;
if T2 = 21 days,
T3 = 21 days;
if T2
10 days,
T3 = 10 days.
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ment or goods in possession of a bailee other than one who
has issued a negotiable document therefor
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods for the purpose of
ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of
loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping,
manufacturing, processing or otherwise dealing
with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or
exchange; or
(b) delivers the instrument to the debtor for the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or of presentation,
collection, renewal or registration of transfer."
Official comment 4 to § 9-304 states that the period of 21 days
in §§ 4 and 5 was chosen "to conform to the provisions of § 60 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act." The selection of the 21-day period
to conform to the Bankruptcy Act raises merely a curiosity as far
as § 9-304 (4) is concerned. With respect to § 9-304 (5) however,
it presents a serious problem. We have seen that the Bankruptcy
Act provides certain protection in § 60 (a) (7) against a possible
harsh and literal reading of § 60(a) (2). Assume a situation
where a security interest in negotiable documents is perfected
by the secured party taking possession of the documents. Assume that the security interest attached on January 10, but that
possession was not taken until January 30. Since possession is
essential to perfect the security interest in the document (absent
filing), the transfer under § 60 (a) (2) would be deemed made on
January 30.160 However, under § 60 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy
Act the transfer, notwithstanding § 60 (a) (2), would be deemed
to be made or suffered at the time of the actual transfer, January
10. Assume in March that the secured party surrenders up the
possession of the documents for a period of, let us say, 29 days.
The security would remain perfected for a period of 21 days and
would be unperfected in the gap between the loss of perfection
and the return of possession at the termination of 29 days. When
possession is regained by the secured party, there is again invulnerability to a lien creditor, and, presumably, a transfer
under § 60 (a) (2). In this situation, § 60 (a) (7) would be of no
help to the secured party, and if the 29th day were within four
months of bankruptcy, a preference problem would be preserited.
Assume now that the Code were amended to provide for a
160 It is assumed in this hypothetical case that there is no § 9-304(4) protection. The security interest did not arise for new value.
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period of 30 days in § 9-304(5). Under such an amendment a
security agreement would remain perfected for the entire 29
days. There would be no transfer deemed made when possession
was returned to the secured party and, therefore, no possibility
of a transfer for an antecedent debt within the meaning of
§ 60(a) (1) B.A. Since the perfection in the negotiable documents continued for 30 days without possession, and since possession was regained prior to the expiration of the 30-day protected
period, there was no time when the documents were vulnerable
under § 9-301 to a lien creditor, and therefore no bankruptcy
preference problem. Why the drafters of Official Comment 4 to
the Uniform Commercial Code felt impelled to pick a 21-day
period on the basis of the Bankruptcy Act is uncertain. However, the 21-day period is now the law under the Code and the
comment does no harm so far as § 9-304 (4) and (5) is concerned.
It does, however, lend support to the argument that when collateral is moved to another state, perfection must be accomplished
the four months provided
within 21 days, 161 rather than within 162
for by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under § 9-103 (3), "If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was
when the security interest attached and before being brought
into the state, the security interest continues perfected in this
state for four months and also thereafter if within the four month
period it is perfected in this state." Here, again, we have no
transfer. The security interest was perfected in the first state.
It continued perfected in the second state for four months. This
continuation was further continued if, within that four month
period, perfection was accomplished by filing or otherwise.
There never was an actual transfer and there never was deemed
a transfer under § 60 (a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. How
§ 60(a) (7) B.A. can impose a requirement in this context is
difficult to fathom. But the Comments to § 9-301 (4)163 apparently have fathomed it and, sooner or later, somebody will make
an attack based upon a failure to perfect within the 21-day
period. The attack is probably doomed to failure for the reasons
advanced in the discussion of § 9-304 (5). The 21 day period of
Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code and § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 76, 96
(1951). Professor Countryman sees a problem here.
162 § 9-103 (3).
163 § 9-304, Official Comment 4.
161

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1970

47

Akron Law Review, Vol. 3 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 1

3 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)

Spring 1970

§ 60 (a) (7) is dated from "Ti" 164 but there is no transfer, actual
or deemed, when the property is brought into another jurisdiction. 165
X. Proceeds
The Uniform Commercial Code provides in § 9-306 (2) that
". a security interest . . . continues in any identifiable pro-

ceeds' 66 including collections received by the debtor." Except for
the difficulty of identifying proceeds which have been commingled, the law is clear and simple to apply. However, under
§ 9-306 (4) difficulties abound. Section 9-306 (4) reads:
"In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or
against a debtor, a secured party with a perfected security
interest in proceeds has a perfected security interest
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money
which is not commingled with other money or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks
and the like which are not deposited in a bank
account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other
cash proceeds have been commingled or deposited
in a bank account, but the perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set-off and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the
amount of any cash proceeds received by the
debtor within ten days before the institution
of the insolvency proceedings and commingled
or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency proceedings less the amount of cash
proceeds received by the debtor and paid over
to the secured party during the ten day period."
A threshold question to be asked about § 9-306 (4) is
whether or not its listing of proceeds, in which a security interest
164

See 159 supra.

165 But see MacLachlan on Bankruptcy 308 (1956).
166 § 9-306(1) "Proceeds includes whatever is received when collateral or
proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term
also includes the account arising when the right to payment is earned under
a contract right. Money, checks and the like are 'cash proceeds.' All other
proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds.'"
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continues in the event of insolvency proceedings, is exclusive or
inclusive. The sense of the Code makes it clear that the answer
is exclusive and support for that is ample. 0 7 Thus, when insolvency proceedings are instituted, and such proceedings obviously include the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, 168 the
security interest is limited to certain identifiable proceeds, those
listed in § 9-306 (4) (a), (b) and (c), and to what we will hereafter refer to as "formula proceeds," those referred to in
§ 9-306 (4) (d). The formula gives the secured party some advantage. He need not trace the proceeds. Tracing " . . . depends
upon difficult and confusing doctrines ... (e.g., first-in, first-out;
non-trust-funds used first; etc.)." 109 However, the secured

party's relief from the difficulties of tracing has been purchased
at a heavy price. Take a situation where a debtor has deposited
proceeds of collateral in a bank account which contains other
proceeds and deposits which are not proceeds. Assume that in
the 30 days prior to bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings,
he has deposited one thousand dollars a day, and that under the
law of tracing, he can identify the thirty thousand dollars. Prior
to the initiation of the insolvency proceedings the secured party
under § 9-306(2) had a security interest in $30,000. At the
moment of initiation of insolvency proceedings, under the
"formula," the security interest goes down to $10,000. What is
the rationale for this reduction in the amount of collateral in
which the secured party has an interest? The answer is that the
Code in this provision seeks to encourage "policing." We have
seen that the Code has overturned the doctrine of Benedict v.
Ratner. 170 Its policing rules were unnecessarily strict, at least as
interpreted by some Courts. "[F]or example it has been thought
necessary for the debtor to make daily remittances to the lender
of all collections received, even though the amount remitted is
immediately returned to the debtor in order to keep the loan at
an agreed level." 171 Such strict rules of policing, generated by
the doctrine of fraud in law, have been abolished by § 9-205, but
the drafters of the Code agree that it is good business practice
167 See Larson Co. v. Pevos, 18 Mich. App. 171, 170 N.W. 2d p. 24, 6 U.C.C.

Rep. 1189 (1969).
168 U.C.C. 1-201(22); B.A. 1(13), 11 U.S.C. 61(13).
169 Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature [California] by Senate Fact
Finding Committee on Judiciary (1959-61) Part 1, The Uniform Commercial
Code, p. 571.
170 268 U.S. 353 (1925), § 9-205.
171 § 9-205 Official Comment 1.
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for secured parties not only to protect themselves, but also to
protect other creditors, by policing collateral. The basis of this
is not difficult to understand. The most tightly drawn security
agreement is a worthless scrap of paper if the collateral has
been dissipated. Hence the Code seeks to avoid dissipation. Professor Gilmore tells us:
"If self-interest does not do the job, § 9-306(4) (d)
supplies the incentive. If a secured party, relying on the
abolition of the Benedict rule, allows his debtor to make unrestricted use of proceeds and collections, paragraph 4 (d)
puts beyond his reach, if insolvency proceedings occur,
everything except the last 10 days' receipts. To protect himself the secured party will have to require periodic accounting; if he does not pick up the proceeds at 10 day intervals,
he will lose them irretrievably in the one contingency where
he will ever need them-the institution of insolvency proceedings." 172
One objection may be made to the above argument. Business
practice may not always dictate the necessity of policing. In any
individual case, a secured party may, on the basis of long association with the debtor or otherwise, have sufficient trust and
confidence in him that he feels, on the basis of sound business
judgment, that policing is not required. The Code's underlying
purposes and policies include permitting "continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of
parties." 173 To the extent that good business practices may be
identified, there is no vice in legislation. The difficulty is that
good business practices are not generally reducible to pat formulae.
May a secured party circumvent the policing rule by requiring a debtor to deposit proceeds in a separate bank account? The
answer is clearly yes under the California version of § 9-306
where § 9-306 (4) (a) grants, in the event of insolvency proceedings, a perfected security interest not only in identifiable noncash proceeds, but also in "a separate bank account containing
only proceeds." 174 The permanent Editorial board for the Uni175
form Commercial Code rejected the California Amendment.
2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.9 p. 1340
(1965).

172
173

§ 1-102(2) (b).

174 Ann. Cal. Code tit. 23, § 9-306.

Report No. 2, The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report on Variations to Code in Adopting States, 212.
175
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It reasoned that ".

.

. California has only made explicit what is

otherwise the necessary construction of the statute." 176 A reading of § 9-306 (4) (a) (b) and (c) of the unamended Code 177 does
not make it clear that California's Amendment is unnecessary.
Without it the sense of the California Amendment does not
appear to be a necessary construction of the Code. "In the event
of insolvency proceedings" a perfected security interest in proceeds is granted by the Code only in certain types of cash
proceeds. The cash proceeds referred in § 9-306 (4) (b) and
(4) (c) do not include cash proceeds deposited in a bank account. 1 7 It seems relatively clear that the money deposited in a
separate account does not fall within the definition of identifiable
non-cash proceeds. Non-cash proceeds suggests a used car
turned in on the purchase of a new car. It does not suggest
money or checks, trade acceptances, or the like which are deposited in a separate bank account by the debtor. In fact, money,
checks, and the like in § 9-306 (4) (b) and (c) are explicitly included as a form of cash proceeds, and it is impossible to reconcile this inclusion with the inclusion of money, checks, and the
like within the meaning of non-cash proceeds used in § 9-306
(4) (a). Apart from linguistic analysis, there is a question
whether the California Amendment comports with the policy of
the Code, which is to force the secured party to police collateral.
There is no requirement in the California Amendment that the
secured party exercise any control over the money deposited in
a separate bank account. Under the California law the security
interest in such an account would continue even though the
debtor had full right to withdraw, and did in fact withdraw
funds. The position of the Permanent Editorial Board doubtlessly will carry weight with the courts; and it probably is
desirable, not only in California, but in other states, for the
secured party to insist that proceeds, deposited in a bank, be
deposited in a separate account. Nevertheless, there are difficulties involved in accepting the Permanent Editorial Board's
rationale for the rejection of the California Amendment.
176

Id.

177 The 1962 official text.

This is supported by the California Report, supra, n. 113, which states,
(pp. 571, 572) that unless the term "identifiable noncash proceeds" (in the
unamended Code) includes a separate bank account in which the debtor is
required to deposit proceeds and in which he deposits only proceeds, then
the right of the secured party to such a bank account would be limited to
"formula proceeds" under 9-306(4) (d). But see Gilmore, supra n. 172, at
1338.
178
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The discussion thus far might suggest that § 9-306(4) (d)
was a victory for the general creditors' lobby and that the
California Amendment was a victory for the secured party which
partially ameliorated the adverse effects of § 9-306 (4) (d). Such
an assumption would be subject to question, however, for the
"formula proceeds" provision of § 9-306 (4) (d) has come under
heavy attack as a violation of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
1 79
Professor Marsh, in his review of Professor Gilmore's treatise,
seriously questions the invulnerability in bankruptcy of the security interests in "formula proceeds." His attacks are based on
three sections of the Bankruptcy Act, any of which may be
lethal. 80° The first section considered is § 67 (c). This was
amended in 1966, after the publication of Marsh's article. However, the amendment does not take the sting out of § 67 (c) if the
security interest in formula proceeds is a "statutory lien." Under
the amendment § 67 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act now provides:
"(1) [T] he following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the
insolvency of the debtor. . .

."

Since the formula proceeds arise

"in the event of insolvency proceedings" (§ 9-306 (4)), the present § 67 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act would be damning if the
security interest in formula proceeds under § 9-306 (4) (d) were
a statutory lien. The term "statutory lien" is defined in the
Bankruptcy Act as ".

.

. a lien arising solely by force of statute

upon specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include
any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give
security, whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also
dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement or
lien is fully effective by statute." 181 (Emphasis supplied.) Since
the security interest in "formula proceeds" arises from a consensual transaction, and is dependent upon an agreement to give
security, it is expressly excluded by the Bankruptcy Act's
definition of a statutory lien.' 8 2 This is not to say that the legislative history to the 1966 Amendment' 8 3 to the Bankruptcy Act is
179

Marsh, Book Review, 13 UCLA L. Rev. p. 898, 907-909 (1966).

180 Sections 60, 67 & 70 (c) Bankruptcy Act.
181 B.A. § 1(29). At the time of the Marsh book review, supra n. 179, it was

not a defined term.
182 But see 4A Collier on Bankruptcy 710 (14th ed. 1969), where the opinion is offered that it is a statutory lien because "the security agreement itself would not cover the cash and bank accounts of the debtor" and because
"it is an additional lien on additional collateral granted by the U.C.C. under
the prescribed circumstances."
183 80 Stat. 268 (1966).
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irrelevant. A House Report8 4 characterizes liens which become
effective only in the event of insolvency as spurious liens, which
are in reality disguised priorities. Consensual liens, which by
definition escape invalidation under § 67 (c) B.A., are vulnerable
under § 64 B.A., if they are characterized as priorities. Birth of
a lien at the moment insolvency proceedings are instituted is
one of the indicia of a priority. 8 5 Can one not reason by analogy
from § 67 (c) that if statutory liens are really disguised priorities
if they become effective upon the insolvency of the debtor, consensual liens are likewise disguised priorities if they first become
effective in the event of insolvency proceedings? The vulnerability of formula proceeds under § 64 of the Act will be discussed infra. At present, we will consider a second attack leveled
by Professor Marsh.
Professor Marsh claims that unless formula proceeds "represent identifiable proceeds," the security interest is vulnerable
under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. He states: "[T]he only
argument which a person claiming a section 9-306(4) (d) lien
could use against an attack by a trustee in bankruptcy under
section 70 (c) would be that his lien under state law attached
simultaneously with the trustee's lien rights under federal
law." 186 (Emphasis in original.) Professor Marsh suggests that
a trustee in bankruptcy under § 70 (c) would have rights superior
to a simultaneously-perfected security interest. The Lewis
case"8 " holds that the trustee in bankruptcy gets his rights under
§ 70 (c) at the moment of bankruptcy. Justice Douglas pointed
out that:
"... one consistent theory underlies the several versions
of section 70 sub. c . . . (T)he rights of creditors . . . to

which the trustee succeeds are to be ascertained as of 'the
date of bankruptcy' not at an anterior point of time." 18
Despite certain language in Collier on Bankruptcy,8 9 it is irrelevant (since the Supreme Court in Lewis rejected the doctrine
House Report No. 686, 89th Cong. 1st sess. (1965).
In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
186 Marsh, supra n. 113, at 908.
187 Lewis v. ManufacturersNat. Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
188 Id. at 607.
189 The opinion is offered in Collier (n. 182 supra at 710) that § 70(c) B.A.
may be used against the security interests in unidentifiable proceeds. We
are told, quite correctly, that "if an attaching creditor had levied upon the
(Continued on next page)
184
185
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of Constance v. Harvey) 190 that a lien creditor who obtained his
lien the day before bankruptcy could obtain rights superior to
those of the secured party. When we turn to simultaneous perfection, we have a problem which was discussed earlier in a different context, and the conclusion we reached there applies here.
That conclusion was that under § 9-201 and § 9-301 (1) (b) of the
Uniform Commercial Code a perfected security interest is effective against a lien creditor whose lien is obtained simultaneously
with the security interest. It appears that attacks under § 67 (c)
and 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act may be safely discounted. The
real danger, it appears to the writer, flows from B.A. § 60 and
§ 64. Professor Marsh states:
"[A] previously nonexistent lien which springs up under
state law at the moment of bankruptcy to secure an antecedent debt would seem to raise a serious question-as to
whether it is a voidable preference under section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act." 191

Professor Gilmore defends "formula proceeds" against the attack
that it is a vulnerable state-created priority and against the attack that it is a voidable preference. Concerning priorities he
writes:
...
(I)n ninety-nine cases out of a hundred (the estimate is conservative), what will be in the debtor's account
on the date of insolvency, in any case where a secured party
has a § 9-306 (4) (d) claim, will have come from deposits of
proceeds to a much greater extent than the carefully limited
amount of the claim." 192
He insists that attacks on § 9-306 (4) (d) are based on a "superficial reading" of that section, and he goes on to assert that:
"in the great run of cases, whatever is left in the debtor's
bank account on bankruptcy day will represent deposits of
proceeds of collateral made during the several weeks preceding bankruptcy. On pre-Code theories of tracing, the
secured party in many cases might be able to establish his
claim to the entire balance. Paragraph 4 (d) restricts his
(Continued from preceding page)
bank accounts of the debtor prior to bankruptcy, there is no doubt that he
would take priority over a secured creditor if insolvency proceedings commenced thereafter." (Emphasis supplied.) The treatise writer adds: "At the
date of bankruptcy, the trustee is such an attaching creditor." He is not,
and the assertion that he is conflicts with the Lewis case (supra n. 187).
The trustee is not on who levies prior to bankruptcy.
190 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954).
191 Marsh, supra n. 122, at 908.
192

Supra n. 172, at 1339.
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claim to whatever may have been received during the 10
days, less the required deductions." 193
He argues that a rule which re-enacts "the substance if not the
form of the Benedict rule" should not be invalidated. 19 4 His
arguments against the attack on § 9-306 (4) (d) based on § 60
B.A. are in a similar vein. He admits:
"It would surely not be hard to construct a § 60 argument
against a 'security interest' which, on the filing of a bankruptcy petition, attached, for the first time to the bankrupt's
unencumbered 'general assets.'" 195
Then he argues that § 9-306 (4) (b) of the Code, unlike § 10 (b)
of the UTRA "does not give a claim to 'general assets,' but only
to money in the bank account. Factually, the possibility that the
bank account will be made up of anything but the deposits and
collections of proceeds is small indeed." 196
Professor Gilmore's arguments (not all of which are listed
supra) are very persuasive, and perhaps should lead to an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, validating section 9-306 (4)
(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code. His argument that, in
the great run of cases, trustees in bankruptcy will be helped
and general creditors will get a greater dividend under the Code
provision than under pre-Code laws of tracing, which the Bankruptcy Act recognized, is persuasive. The difficulty with this
approach is that the trustee in bankruptcy may not be interested
that, in general, trustees will be benefited by this section. He
will argue that under the criteria, admittedly vague, for determining what is a priority, this is a state-created priority; and he
will argue further that there is a preference, assuming he can
show that the transferee, secured party, had reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
What is a priority? In re Harpeth Motors, Inc. held that
§ 10 (b) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act did not create a
priority.1 97 However, there was language in the Harpeth case
which is disturbing to those defending § 9-306 (4) (d) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Court writes that section 10 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act does not make

"...

the insolvency

Id.at 1340.
Id.
195 Id. at 1344.
193
194

196 Id.
197

Supra n. 185.
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of the trustee a condition precedent to the rights conferred" 198
by that section. The rights, it is said, were intended to be preserved "even in the absence of a proceeding looking to the general distribution of the assets of the trustee." 199 The rights
granted by section 9-306(4) (d) arise only "in the event of insolvency proceedings." Thus, even the Harpeth case, to which
one might look for support of the Code, has language which is
2 0°
held that § 10 of
troublesome. In re Crosstown Motors, Inc.
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act ".

.

. does not create a lien on

the general assets of the Bankrupt, but is a state-created priority
104 . .. " 201
invalid under § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act 11 U.S.C.A.
The reasoning of the Court leaves something to be desired. The
court relied heavily on the fact that the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act used the word "priority" in describing the interest protected.
The Code drafters originally used the word "priority" in § 9-306
(4) (d), but avoided the verbal trap by changing the language
20 2
Section 9-306(4) makes
after the Harpeth case was decided.
is a perfected security
interest
(d)
it clear that the § 9-306 (4)
the trustee in bankdeprives
terminology
interest. The change in
dispositive on the
be
hardly
can
but
ruptcy of one argument,
20 3
teaches that
Inc.
Motors,
Harpeth
re
question of priority. In
examination
an
upon
but
labels
upon
the test does not depend
created.
of the nature of the interest
One basis of argument that the Uniform Commercial Code
interest created by § 9-306 (4) (d) is not a priority, and one way
to distinguish the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, is that the Uniform Trust Receipts Act gave a claim on the general assets of the
bankrupt, whereas the Uniform Commercial Code's interest is
04
Other tests are suggested. Professor
more circumscribed. 2
Honnold, under the heading "Lien v. Priority: the search for an
objective test" asks two questions: 205
"... [One] is it not necessary to ascertain the concrete situa-

tions in which state law would preclude a levy by creditors
against the assets in question? Cf. Bankruptcy Act Section

198 Id. at 868.
199 Id.
200 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 363 U.S. 811 (1960).
201

Id. at 225.

202

Gilmore, supra n. 172, at 1343, 1344.

203

Supra n. 185.

204

Gilmore, supra n. 172, at 1344.

205 E. Farnsworth and J. Honnold, Commercial Law 896 (1968).
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60 (a) (2). [Two] Would it not also be helpful to consider
the extent to which state law has impact apart from stating
rules of priority for the distribution of assets in an insolvency proceedings?"
The interest created by § 9-306 (4) (d) of the Code seems to be
in trouble under both questions. Up to the time of bankruptcy
the proceeds commingled with other money in a bank account
would be subject to lien creditors, and the § 9-306 (4) (d) rule
under state law has no impact at all, apart from stating rules
of priority for the distribution of certain assets in insolvency
proceedings.
It would seem that the interests of the secured party in
"formula proceeds" under § 9-306 (4) (d) of the U.C.C. is indeed
precarious. However, hope need not be abandoned. There are
technical reasons supporting the secured party against a preference attack, 206 and the priority test under § 64 is sufficiently
vague that a court may go either way. Given judicial latitude,
Gilmore's policy and fairness arguments take on added significance.
XI. Technical Defense Against a Preference Charge
Section 9-306 (4) (d) poses a preference problem because the
transfer, made simultaneously with the filing of a bankruptcy
petition, will invariably be for an antecedent debt. That there is
a transfer is, of course, unmistakable. Prior to the petition there
was no interest held by the secured party in the bank account
of the debtor. At the instant the petition is filed, § 9-306(4) (d)
grants to the secured party an interest he did not have before.
However, to constitute a preference a transfer must occur "within
four months before the filing . . . of the petition.

. .

initiating a

proceeding under this Act." 207 (emphasis supplied). Section
9-306 (4) makes it clear that the transfer takes place "in the
event of insolvency proceedings." Insolvency proceedings clearly
include Bankruptcy proceedings. 206 Thus the reasonable construction of § 9-306 (4) is that the transfer takes place at the
very instant the petition is filed, not before filing. Thus, one
of the essential elements of a bankruptcy preference is missing,
and the trustee, if he is to prevail, must look to some other see206

Infra, next paragraph.

207

BA. 60(a).

208

U.C.C. 1-201(22).
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tion of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 64 is the obvious section
and the outcome there is, as indicated, uncertain.
XII. Prior Identifiable Proceeds
Thus far we have been assuming, with respect to § 9-306 (4)
(d), that the bank account, whether it contained proceeds or
not, did not contain proceeds identifiable prior to the "event
of insolvency proceedings." The attacks of the trustee are
easily repulsed if the bank account contained funds identifiable
as proceeds. Here § 9-306(4) (d) would either cut down the
secured party's interest previously safe under § 9-306(2), or
grant a security interest, according to formula, equal to the
identifiable proceeds. The second alternative, a happy one for
the secured party, would occur if collections were made every
ten days.
There would be no preference problem (assuming the security interest in the identifiable proceeds was invulnerable),
since there would be no transfer of the property of the debtor.
There would be no problem under § 67(c) B.A., because the
lien does not first become effective upon the insolvency of the
debtor.2 0 9 Section 70(c) B.A. would pose no problem, since
the security interest would antedate bankruptcy and there would
be continuous perfection. 210 As for the § 64 B.A. attack, in addition to the defenses listed above, there would be the additional
defense that the security interest did not arise at the institution
of insolvency proceedings, and that the secured party was safe
from lien creditors prior to the insolvency proceedings.
Xm. Conclusion
In writings and speeches too numerous to mention, the Code
has been subjected to attack, and often the cudgel has been,
quite naturally, the Bankruptcy Act. Underlying the technical
bases of attacks, there lies hostility to the Code's allowance of
perfection of security interests in a wide range of collateral in a
manner that is relatively easy, even for the amateur. Some of
these attacks have been reviewed in this article. The Code opponents fear that the great power granted by the Code will result in actions that are unwise. Financing institutions may over209

§ 9-303 (2).

210

Id.
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reach in demanding security, and debtors may unwisely exhaust their capacity to attract capital. Indeed these evils may
be attendant on the Code's liberality. But the legislature is not
the only force that has the power of deterring folly. The invisible hand of Adam Smith, the workings of the market place,
is effective to ferret it out. Indeed it is a better mechanism
than legislative action. For if the Code had restricted the areas
in which security could be perfected, it undoubtedly would
have condemned wise action along with the unwise. Broad
legislation cannot be effectively refined to make distinctions in
all areas where delicate business judgment can adequately do
the job. It is the best part of wisdom to broadly validate security
interests, with appropriate restrictions for publication, possession,
etc. and leave it to individual decision to work out the best devices unfettered by legislative restrictions. The following is a
slightly altered quote from Davis v. Turner:
"If a short and easy mode could be found of cutting up
[folly] . . . by the roots, the discovery would be invaluable,

but such an enterprise is beyond the limits of human wisdom." 211
Lacking such wisdom, the legislature, in invalidating broadly, will inevitably impair legitimate and wise financing in its attempt to limit security devices to prevent possible abuses. The
drafters of the Code avoided this trap without trenching on the
general policies and purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Their
works should bear fruit unimpaired by that Act.
211

4 Grottan 422 (1848).
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